

The Existential Relation of Mood and Self in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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In this paper I will attempt to describe the transcendental relation of mood and self in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* and how his account of the possibility of this relation is an important existentialist theme uniting his work with Kierkegaard and Sartre despite ontological and other differences in their systems.

Heidegger wished to understand the ontological structure of existence and thus began his analysis of Da-sein¹. This analysis asked the transcendental questions of how moods are possible, how they relate to understanding and whether they are a necessary structure of being-in-the-world. Heidegger suggests that moods are a transcendental necessity for the experience of being, including the existential being of the self.

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¹ That being which always already has a concerned relation to being. Sartre would later call this 'human reality'.

A sense of *Stimmung*

Heidegger uses the term *Stimmung* (lit. 'tendency') to describe our qualitative attunement to the world. This usage follows the term that Kierkegaard used for mood in Danish, *Stemning*. In Kierkegaard, our moods constitute our attunement to the world, to others and to our selves and this attunement itself is a call toward self-development from out of the imbalance of our current constitution (in terms of our relations to necessity and possibility). Heidegger uses the 'category', or rather what he calls the *existential*², of *Befindlichkeit* (situatedness, findedness), in reference to the ontological structure of moods. In this existential analysis of moods, Heidegger notes that it is through moods that one knows how one is and how one is faring. Through our attunement, we always find ourselves in some situation or other. One always finds oneself attuned to one's being-in-the-world. Because mood always discloses Da-sein as being in a situation, it also discloses being-in-the-world as such. Finding oneself, one always finds that one is in this or that mood, be it a mood of quiet reflection of impassioned engagement. A mood always brings a situation with it, so it always discloses the world too and never ourselves alone. Some qualitative states, such as fear, disclose and interpret particular entities in a situation³ (e.g. a facial expression as threatening), while

² An existential is an a priori 'category' that is applied to Da-sein and its explication. Existentials are to be sharply distinguished from determinations of the being of those beings unlike Da-sein called categories. Categories determine a *what* or objective presence, existentials determine a *who* or existence.

³ See Bedford, Errol, *Emotion*, [1956] *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, ed. D. Gustafson, New York: Doubleday (1964), in which it is argued that it is not the difference in pure *qualia* (or 'raw feelings') that account for the difference between

others, such as ennui or joy, are not so much directed at this or that entity, but at the world as a whole. While we cannot know or perceive the world as a whole, we can have a general attunement towards it such that it becomes experienced 'as a whole' for us, whether we are smiling peacefully at this whole or whether 'man delights me not' and the heavens have become some 'stale promontory'. These moods disclose the world as a whole and describe this world with infinite hues, flavours and rich notes. Heidegger remarks that attunement both reveals world and possibilities as well as closes them off more than anything else. This is because our qualitative openness to the world delivers us to wondrously varying vistas of experience and at the same time these particular colourings of experience close off other possibilities of being-in-the world. For example, Hamlet in the slump of despondency knows that man and the world ought to be wonderful and yet his mood cannot afford him delight. Hamlet's particular circumstance is dependent on his interpretation of events and his moody relation to the world reflects this.

The mood of anxiety has a special place in Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein because it reveals being-in-the-world as such insofar as it is a mood in which entities recede in significance. Without going too deeply into

shame and embarrassment, but their interpretation in social terms of responsibility or innocence. Shame discloses us as morally deficient compared to the others around us, while embarrassment reveals our commonness with others, which commonness is usually hidden. For Heidegger, the different disclosive possibilities of different moods shows that there can be no pure qualia because every instance of feeling brings an understanding with it. Shame discloses us as morally deficient compared to the others around us, while embarrassment reveals our commonness with others, whose commonness is usually hidden.

Heidegger's analysis of particular moods, the point I am making here is that for Heidegger moods disclose aspects of the world and of existence from out of the structure of Da-sein itself, which being is being-in-the-world. Here we may see a parallel with Kierkegaard's writings wherein moods arise because of a deeper underlying situation, the metaphysical description of which was elaborated in *The Sickness Unto Death*. In Kierkegaard, moods are cued by some external situation, but they can only arise because the individual is susceptible so long as the problem of the self remains. For Kierkegaard, the basis of such moods as anxiety and despair is the individual's not being an authentic self.

Heidegger argues that we 'can, should and must' master our moods⁴. He agrees here with Kierkegaard as the latter calls for mastery of mood by an act of will and passing into and through mood in order to reach the disclosure that mood brings about the self. A difference between the two authors is that Heidegger has moved away from a focus on subjectivity and has being-in-the-world as his valid point of departure. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, makes subjectivity a central field in his writings, but this should not be misunderstood as the immediately given and apodictic ego, the starting point of Cartesian philosophy: Kierkegaard's self is rather the problematic end and goal of his efforts. The subjectivity studied by Kierkegaard on the way towards the self is the pathos that he takes to be indicative of the individual's struggling with the existential imperative to be oneself. In Heidegger and Kierkegaard, moods bring one back to

⁴ *Being and Time*, op. cit., p.136.

something: for Kierkegaard, they bring one back to the self grounded in its Constituting Power (God or Nature); for Heidegger, they bring one back to the concrete situation and our potentiality within it, to being affected by and open to a world that matters.

We will explore how Heidegger, in his analysis of Da-sein, uses his concept of the equiprimordiality of mood and understanding to ground a picture of being-in-the-world which shows as naive the charge of irrationalism directed at any philosophy that takes mood to be an essential and important aspect of human existence.

Being-There

The term Da-sein has a deliberately elusive meaning. It denotes not the body, nor consciousness, nor mental substance, nor spirit, nor soul, nor a set of faculties, nor ego, nor an atomic self. Da-sein is a concept that resists reification, thus it avoids following the traditionally set paths of Judeo-Christianity, anthropology, physiology, psychology and other traditional interpretations of human being. There is a precedent in using a term which applies to man in such a way that it announces itself as not necessarily applying to man alone or even to only those traditionally understood qualities of man. The precedent is found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, wherein the limits of the understanding apply not only as limits to human being, but also to angelic and any other possible intellectual and intuiting beings that are not god-like insofar as they do not utterly create the objects

of their world and indeed the world in its entirety. Thus the First Critique can be seen as a study in reason's finitude and its importance for any possible rational and understanding beings. Comparisons between Da-sein and Kant's concept of the understanding will not take the strain of being laboured; we shall rest with their similarity in not being applied, of necessity, solely to human being and, *a fortiori*, to any traditional interpretations of human being.

Heidegger saw his work in philosophy as the pursuit and the retrieval of the question of the meaning of being. His analyses of Da-sein and his incursions into philosophical anthropology were always instrumental to his ontological pursuit. In order to approach the question of the meaning of being, Heidegger sought first to approach that being who itself raises this question: Da-sein - the way of being who in its *being* is its *there*. Da-sein is always situated and relates meaningfully to the being of its surrounding entities as it relates itself to its own being. "These beings, in their being, comport themselves towards their being."⁵ In running for a bus, in clay pigeon shooting or watching the clouds go by, in finding myself in one activity, in losing myself in another, I am comporting myself towards my being. This way of thinking is almost immediately comparable to Kierkegaard's definition of the self as that reflexivity in the relation to the poles of existence which relates to itself in its relating. Kierkegaard has it that the self or the spirit 'is dreaming' while one relates perfectly well to the world and to possibilities and necessities without, in these relations,

⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 67.

relating back to this very relation itself as another, and most vital, 'term' in the relation. Heidegger, however, stresses that in its relations to the being of entities, Da-sein is *always* and is *already* primarily relating to its own being. It seems that Heidegger aims to correct Kierkegaard when he says that Da-sein is not only always already relating to itself, but that it cannot help but do so. Heidegger remains in accord with Kierkegaard, all the same, in noting that this relationship to one's own being as such can either be lost in inauthenticity wherein one, in a state Heidegger calls 'fallenness', projects oneself onto entities and into tasks and 'merges into things'⁶, or may be won in authenticity, which is that perspicuous way of being that fully manifests what it is to be Da-sein. Heidegger defines this perspicuity or transparency as 'knowledge of the self in order to indicate that it is not a matter here of perceptually finding and gazing at a point which is the self, but of grasping and understanding the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world *throughout all* its essential constitutive factors.'⁷ Heidegger's sparing use of the word 'self' in his writings is supposed to avoid that reification of self of which Hume complained when he noted that when he set his attention inward and in search of his 'self' he could at best find some sensation as warm hands or an itch behind the ear. The above quotation puts Heidegger's understanding of Da-sein in direct continuity with Kierkegaard's existential understanding of self as a praxis of transparent and authentic self-relation, a dynamic self-relation that is a relation to the world which then relates back to itself as that relation.

⁶ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p.160, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 146.

Heidegger moves towards an understanding of being through his existential analytic of Da-sein - that being for whom being (its own being) is an issue. We will focus on Heidegger's analysis of situatedness with the aim of showing how world, understanding and mood are equiprimordial aspects of our being-in-the-world. We can see as a precedent to this Kant's attempt to show how experience requires an equiprimordial constellation of space, time and the categories of the understanding on the one hand, intuited phenomena on the other and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the middle as the way of generating schemata to apply the categories of the understanding to particular things and events in the world. Heidegger understands mood as 'prefiguring' understandable, tenable situations and his approach is in response to the transcendental question of how the kind of experience of Da-sein, an experience that is free to understand being, is indeed possible.

Heidegger notes that we are always somehow oriented within the world. Circumstances (L. surrounding conditions) are perceived as problematic, useful or indifferent relative to one's perspective, one's intents and purposes. These intents and purposes are, however, not to be thought as pre-existing one's situation and general circumstance. Heidegger uses the word *Befindlichkeit* (Ger. fixedness, situatedness⁸; the word connotes an affectual relation to things and circumstances) for the existential⁹ of being

⁸ *Befindlichkeit* is variously translated 'State-of-mind' (Macquarrie and Robinson), 'Situatdness' (Guignon), and 'Attunement' (Stambaugh). ⁸ See above, note 3, this chapter.

⁹ An *existential* is a 'category' that applies to the necessary constituents (e.g. moodedness, openness to world, understanding, conscience) of Da-sein.

oriented or attuned to the world. Of course orientation always has a direction, an aim of at least a general order, but it has other cognitive aspects such that it incorporates beliefs, knowledge and understanding. With these cognitive aspects any orientation still remains impossible without an affective dimension of evaluative feelings and desires constructively informing its conativity. Orientation always has its mood. Heidegger denotes this mood with, as we noted earlier, the German word *Stimmung*, which means 'tuning' or 'tendency'. This situatedness brought about by mood contains a capacity to be moved and to relate to things and circumstances as meaningful. Emotions, attitudes, interests, desires, preferences, sentiments, passions, attractions, and moods: these are all contained in the concept of situatedness.

For Heidegger, moods are a necessary aspect of situatedness. They are more general than, being comprehensive of, emotions or feelings and express our total orientation. Moods are hence as pervasive as orientations. To be mood free requires that one is orientation free. To be without mood or orientation would be to be placed in the impossible position of Burridan's Ass, which hypothetical creature was described by the 14th Century philosopher as having reason alone and thus, finding itself between two equidistant and equally sized bales of hay, starved to death for want of a reason to choose one bale over the other. This impossible ass would be some sort of robot, devoid of 'world', having no objects through which it could relate to itself because moods would be necessary for objects to have motivational sway. Mood is a central concept in Heidegger's understanding of the way in which we are what we are. Da-sein, he argues,

has three interrelated foundational elements, namely affect, understanding and articulation (discourse), which elements compose Da-sein's relationality.

As mentioned earlier, Heidegger moves in direct continuity with Kierkegaard in his understanding of the dynamic and self-relating self. Da-sein is understood primarily as relation. The world is discovered in Da-sein; Da-sein is discovered in the world. We will look to the existentials of attunement and understanding, Heidegger's equiprimordial existentials that various traditions categorially understood as the opposing forces of *pathos* and *logos*, passion and reason, feeling and understanding. Heidegger describes the complex relationality of Da-sein as Care. Da-sein is not some Hegelian or Aristotelian thought engaged in thinking itself. Da-sein cares about its real existence in a world with others. Da-sein's basic state is being-in-the-world and as such it cannot be reduced to abstract or detached individuality. Da-sein is inextricably related to others, to a context, to nature, to meaningful and useful objects and all the while, through these relations, Da-sein is necessarily relating to itself. As I relate to friend or to foe, to flowers by the brook or to graffiti by the bridge, I relate to myself because I exist precisely insofar as I am being-in-the-world. Da-sein is active and reflexive relationality:

'I *live* in the understanding of writing, lighting things up, walking in and out and the like. More precisely, I am - as Da-sein - speaking, walking, understanding, intelligible dealings. My being-in-the-world *is* nothing other than this being-in-motion that already understands...'¹⁰.

We are a purposive motion within a world in which others are always implicated. To be human is to be 'a placeholder in a network of internal relations, constituted by a human language, of the communal world into which Da-sein is thrown.'¹¹

No self can be conceived in abstraction from a world, a society, a language, or its own agency. Our life-world is a sphere of internal relations. From this perspective, Heidegger's concern is to unearth underlying structures from what is manifest in our everyday existing.

This understanding of Da-sein as embedded within significant relations, related to the task of unearthing meaning out of the context of everyday existence, brings us to Heidegger's hermeneutics. Heidegger does not apply some hermeneutic or other, in the way a play can be read through a Marxist, a Freudian, a feminist or some other hermeneutic. Heidegger does not supply some key or other with which to interpret phenomena or existence. He argues that in every case understanding is *already* interpretation. For Heidegger, hermeneutics is an existential and not a methodological category. It designates not only a condition for the understanding of others, but also an originally pre-theoretical capacity necessary to being-in-the-world. Interpretation is a necessary feature of the human life-world. We recognize values, usefulness and importance in the world around us. Any applied hermeneutic technique is destined in advance to

¹⁰ Heidegger's lecture notes, 1925/26, quoted in Guignon, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983, p.88.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.87.

come too late for Heidegger. If we set out to interpret something, then this is too late, for it is already interpreted *as this something*. This is Heidegger's famous hermeneutic circle. Not only are we always interpreting, with this interpretation feeding itself back as nourishment and prejudice into our understanding, we are also always self-interpreting. Interpretation is not some mode or other which we may pick up and put down as one method among others, applying only sometimes and when we choose. We cannot exist without interpreting. All the stronger does this apply to philosophy. Heidegger acknowledges that the interpretation must always be circular. We cannot begin with axioms, with apodictic truths from which we may construct an edifice of understanding and knowledge of ourselves. Any understanding must involve a back-and-forth movement between partial meanings and the whole (which must already have been in some fashion understood or grasped). Fundamental ontology must therefore move back and forth between uncovering structural items of Da-sein and a pre-understanding of the totality. This circularity of understanding and of self-understanding ensures that Da-sein is hermeneutically structured.

Understanding is not to be posited as ontologically prior to attunement. Heidegger argues that they are equiprimordial. Affect has cognitive aspects. Every feeling knows and understands something after its fashion. The shock and pang of a stubbed toe knows the obstacle as such. The joy at hearing a friend's voice knows the value of the friend and anticipates shared interests. This joy understands and is open to the being of the friend as *another* being like itself and not just as a pleasing object,

sometimes there sometimes not. Every feeling constitutes an interpretation of one's situation. Bereavement is not 'just a feeling'. It relates to the loved and lost one. What one feels *makes sense*. It contains a sense and has a significant referent - a person whose memory somehow involves the world as a whole. Despair, as Kierkegaard argued, can only be felt when the task of choosing oneself becomes apparent; without a certain *understanding*, it cannot be felt. General moods, be they 'up' or 'down', behold the world as such. Thus affect shapes our world. In depression, every grumble of indigestion becomes the bile of self-disappointment. Someone can fall in love and no sensation is meaningless, the heart's beating, the feel of sun or rain on the face, all sensation is enveloped and cast into the future to receive a meaning: the meaning's fluctuate from the fear of not living up to the beloved's expectations to the anticipation of shared joy in the unfolding of each other's presence as they explore each other's worlds. The raw feel of rain on the face is never present; it becomes a concrete example of being alive in a world of possibilities. Behind these understandings illuminated by attunements is an understanding, however roughly thought out, if at all, of what it is to be alive in a world and to relate to others. Affect makes knowledge possible; it is already there at the beginning of knowledge and of understanding.

The existential (a priori structure) of attunement or situatedness plays a central role in the program of *Being and Time*. Mood is equiprimordial with understanding and is thus constitutive of world-openness. Spelling out this insight shows how affect makes 'pre-cognitive' experience and explicit knowledge possible. Moods have rationales and an understanding

of the hermeneutic circle helps to bring this aspect of affectivity into focus; understanding requires 'pre-understanding', and this is provided by moods. Moods play a role in the disclosure of self and world and do so both prior to and beyond the range of cognition.

Heidegger is sensitive to the fact that Da-sein has been historically laden with categorial interpretations such that man is understood as rational, as discursive, as consciousness, as subjectivity, as a moral being, etc. Resisting such interpretations, Heidegger attempts a fresh understanding of the being that already is an understanding of being. He attempts an understanding that is faithful to revealed Da-sein and its ways of being. This would amount to an authentic self-understanding.

Opposed to the traditional subject versus object determinations of human beings and the world, Heidegger notes that Da-sein is a way of being inclusive of a 'who' and a 'worldhood' such that neither are exclusive of the other and that neither can be isolated from the other.

Chapter V of *Being and Time* develops the theme of Da-sein's situationality and is hence entitled 'Being-In As Such'. In the first section of Part A, 'The Existential Constitution Of The There', Da-sein is treated as attuned being (§ 29), something which always finds itself in a meaningful relation to its 'there' via moods. '[B]eing in a mood brings being to its "there"'(p.134). Here Heidegger emphasizes the fundamental importance of moods in the constitution of our experience and of our being, rejecting interpretations which take moods to be epiphenomenal in relation to thought and

perceptive apprehension. Often, Heidegger remarks, moods 'remain unnoticed as what is supposedly the most indifferent and fleeting in Da-sein'. In redressing this usual interpretation, Heidegger is not forcibly reducing our being to a constitution that is entirely founded on mood or attunement. Rather, Heidegger's analysis should be seen as unfolding *the unity* of the structures that compose being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is Da-sein's general state and refers to the connectedness of human life with its context. An analysis revealing anything less than the unity of being-in-the-world would be inauthentic.

Section 29 is entitled 'Da-sein As Attunement' and this title should be read as somewhat circular and tautological: being there as situatedness. This section is the first in Part A of Chapter V, 'The Existential Constitution Of The There', which should be read as implying that the situation, 'the there', is constituted in existing (with 'existence' connoting Da-sein's comportment, its 'being towards...' and 'being in', distinguishing it from beings which do not have Da-sein as a mode of being and whose being does not involve 'existing' in this special sense of the word). Heidegger holds that a situation arises from the contributions of affect, understanding and discourse. These three existentials have a transcendental character in Heidegger's work as they are taken to be necessary conditions of any experience of being. They are inseparable in existence and should be seen as aspects in a totality, never to be conceived as existing separately. These three key existentials are to be understood holistically not just because they always happen to arise together but rather because they necessarily involve each other: the meaning of each of these three concepts includes

relations with the others. The assertion of internal relations between understanding and discourse is one that wouldn't raise many philosophical eyebrows, but a supercilious expression often meets the inclusion of affectivity within this circle.

To make sense of the transcendental character of affectivity it must be understood as an existential. Existentials are the essential structures constitutive of Da-sein. They are to be distinguished from categories as categories are tools for understanding present-at-hand things in terms of determinately defined properties of substantial being, whereas the being of Da-sein is not substantiality but *existence*. Because Da-sein's own being is an issue for itself, because it comes out of and retains a history, because it anticipates and projects a future, static present-at-hand categories will always be inappropriate for the analysis of Da-sein. The understanding of Da-sein requires dynamic, ek-static, historical and projective concepts. These concepts are the existentials. Da-sein exists in a way that resists characterization in terms of properties, as Heidegger puts it, "The "essence" of Da-sein lies in its existence', its characteristics are therefore *possible ways for it to be*. When we designate this existence 'Da-sein' 'we are not expressing its "what" but its "being".¹² This does not leave the nature of one's basic structures of existence completely unconditioned. Da-sein is always, for example, 'in-a-world', i.e. a totality of significant and purposive contexts. The ontological structures of Da-sein's existence (the existentials such as world, affect, understanding, discourse, being-in, being-with) lie 'a

¹² *Being and Time*, p.67.

priori.¹³ The existentials mark the contours of human existence in much the same way as Kant's categories of the understanding marked the contours of finite reason. As existentials, affect and understanding help to constitute our experience as an intelligible flow.

The general existentials constitutive of Da-sein's affective structure for Heidegger are 'concern' (one's absorption in the world, reflecting and expressing the telic structure of the roles for the sake of which we do all of the things which occupy us), 'solicitude' (the way we are towards the Da-sein of others in the mode of 'Being-with') and Da-sein's 'being an issue for itself' (which is expressive of Da-sein's having its own existence as a responsibility requiring continual decision and self-relation in whatever it does).

In Chapter V of Division I, Heidegger claims an essential universality for the central feature of Da-sein: being-in-the-world. Only from the encompassing space of this concept can we ground any interpretations of the life-world: 'Insofar as any faith or "world view" makes any such assertions, and if it asserts anything about Da-sein as being-in-the-world, it must come back to the existential structures which we have set forth, provided that its assertions are to make a claim to *conceptual* understanding.'¹⁴ That is to say that any Weltanschauung that radically opposes human being and its life-world is fundamentally in error. Again, supporting the idea that Heidegger takes the existentials to be transcendently deduced and universally and necessarily applicable, Heidegger writes that, 'The

¹³ Ibid., p.70.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.224.

transcendental "generality" of the phenomenon of care of all fundamental *existentials* is, on the one hand, broad enough to present a basis on which *every* interpretation of Da-sein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view must move, whether Da-sein is understood as affliction and the 'cares of life' or in an opposite manner.¹⁵

Mood as an existential: Situatedness

Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* refers to the notion that one 'finds oneself' in one particular situation or another. In German one may ask, '*wie befinden Sie?*', which translates as, 'how do you find yourself?', in sense of asking, 'how are you?'. For Heidegger, situatedness refers to the possibility of having particular moods; it is the existential structure of affectivity. Being a fundamental existential, situatedness is asserted as being implicated in all of Da-sein's other structures. The 'there' of Da-sein is its situation and this is constituted by situatedness together with understanding and discourse. Heidegger holds that situatedness and understanding are equiprimordial in their constitution of the 'there'. Both include discourse. The ontological and holistic meanings of 'equiprimordiality' are stressed when he notes that, "The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple "primal ground"¹⁶. As for the equiprimordiality of the constitution of the

¹⁵ Ibid., p.244.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.170.

'there', Heidegger remarks that, 'A situatedness always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood.'¹⁷

The experience of situatedness, that is to say the ontic-existential expression of situatedness, is always within some mood. There can be no context without attunement; without attunement a situation would cease to exist and become a mere set of spatial co-ordinates. Moods are not, however, to be seen as a purely aesthetic relation to one's context, as if such a thing were possible. Moods are not to be taken as non-rational hues and flavours infused throughout a context and thus merely adding texture to life. Moods contain, and indeed constitute, an implicit understanding of one's being-in-the-world. Elsewhere Heidegger gives a revealing example of the intelligent comportment of affectivity:

'A stone presses downward and manifests its heaviness. But while this heaviness exerts an opposing pressure upon us it denies any penetration into it. If we attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still does not display in its fragments anything inward that has been opened up. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into the same dull pressure and bulk of its fragments. If we try to lay hold of the stone's heaviness in another way, by placing the stone on a balance, we merely bring the heaviness into the form of a calculated weight. This perhaps very precise determination of the stone remains a number, but the weight's burden has

¹⁷ Ibid., p.182.

escaped us. Colour shines and wants only to shine. When we analyse it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.¹⁸

Heidegger is noting that we can immediately grasp objects in terms of their heaviness, colour and so on, in the pre-rational way of being qualitatively affected. In the same essay, he considers that, 'perhaps feeling or mood is more intelligently perceptive, more reasonable, than "thought become ratio", in understandingly laying hold of things in their own being.'¹⁹ We primarily understand things through the apprehension of their qualities and when we try to concentrate on this qualitative apprehending we find that what was immediately apprehended is irreducible to quantity.

It is important to recognize that for Heidegger feelings are not the tools or instruments of some faculty of cognition. Feelings themselves already and directly understand; there is no such thing as a raw sensation. Husserl already understood, after Franz Brentano, that consciousness was necessarily intentional, that it must always be a consciousness *of* something or other. But for Husserl, qualia were raw sensations that only became animated when taken over by some practical, cognitive or axiological intention. Sensation remained a 'primary content', or building block, in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, becoming hyle in his *Ideas*. Non-intentional in Husserl's system, sensation became meaningful only through directed consciousness. Heidegger, in contrast, not only thought

¹⁸ 'The Origin of the Work of Art', *Basic Writings*, p.172.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p151.

actual sensations immediately meaningful, he thought them capable of a more penetrating relation to things than rational analysis. Heidegger points out that, '[W]e never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things [...]; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.'²⁰ The things themselves are much closer to us than sensations. Anyone who attempts to learn how to paint soon discovers that what one usually and immediately sees is quite different from the sensations of colour and form that the artist must be trained to see.

In another essay, Heidegger stresses that attunement is a fundamental occurrence of Da-sein and a one which is necessary for anything like having experience: 'Such being attuned, in which we "are" one way or another and which determines us through and through, lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole. Finding ourselves attuned not only unveils beings as a whole in various ways, but this unveiling—far from being merely incidental—is also the fundamental occurrence of Da-sein.

What we call a "feeling" is neither a transitory epiphenomenon of our thinking and will compartment, nor simply an impulse that provokes such compartment, nor merely a present condition we have to find some way of

²⁰ 'The Origin of the Work of Art', op. cit., p.152.

copied with.¹²¹

The last sentence quoted complements Heidegger's insistence that his analysis of Da-sein is philosophically prior to any psychological analysis. Heidegger's concern with moods comes not from a psychology which begins with a conception of human being as an entity, but rather from his ontological quest towards an understanding of being which must first look to that very being for whom being (i.e. its own being) is already an issue, and hence already understood or grasped in some pre-understanding fashion. Fundamental ontology thus begins with and constantly returns to the whole phenomenon of human being, a task that requires the consideration of the everyday experience of the lived world for the being in whose existence being is an issue.

Heidegger is thus keen to criticize the traditional view that moods merely obscure, rather than help to construct, the intelligibility of a situation. That moods can often be fleeting, Heidegger takes as evidence that 'in every case Da-sein always has some mood.'¹²² As we mentioned earlier, Heidegger remarks that, 'Da-sein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods;' not forgetting, however, that mood is prior to cognition and volition, we remember that, '...when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood, we are never free of moods.'¹²³ With reference to the objection one may raise to the occurrence of indifference

²¹ 'What is Metaphysics?', *Pathmarks*, p.87.

²² *BT*, p.173.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.175.

pointing to a total absence of mood, Heidegger writes that indifference is 'far from nothing at all' and that in this experience, being has become manifest as a burden. Rather than being affected by this thing or by that project, in indifference, as with profound boredom, one is affected by the 'burden' of being as a whole, which experience, if it persists, can very definitely be felt, Heidegger claims, as unpleasant.

Despite attacking the traditional view that moods obscure the intelligibility of a situation, Heidegger seems in agreement with many traditional philosophers in thinking that moods are themselves obscure insofar as they resist intellectual comprehension. Heidegger's reason for holding this opinion is not that we are prone to our 'passions', or that moods are epiphenomenal, but is rather that he sees attunement as having a disclosive priority over the *ratio* of reason. Mood is impenetrable by cognition because mood is a more original mode of disclosing beings and of disclosing itself for Da-sein. Heidegger describes this in saying that, 'the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Da-sein is brought before its being as "there".'²⁴ A mood lets us know our situation in an original way, allowing the understanding to formulate an explicit judgement. We are led to conceive of attunement as exceeding the range of cognitive disclosure; what attunement provides we grasp immediately with mood and feeling. Mood and feeling are thus essential ways of being in a situation: essential ways of being open to beings and of being open to

²⁴ Ibid., p.173.

Da-sein simultaneously. While attunement is to be seen as providing a primordial disclosure, it must not be forgotten that this disclosure always has its understanding, which is to repeat that the equiprimordiality of situatedness and understanding must not be overlooked. Da-sein comes across itself in its situation not in a cognitive fashion, but rather by 'finding itself in the mood that it has'.²⁵

Moods and the Original Synthesis of Experience

Against the tradition, Heidegger does not see moods as filters that colour and distort perception and cognition: moods are not merely the subjective gloss over what would otherwise be objective states-of-affairs. Against an interpretation of moods as peripheral, Heidegger puts the case that moods help to co-ordinate the original synthesis of experience.

This last phrase, 'the original synthesis of experience', has an obviously Kantian ring. It may prove useful to remind ourselves of Kant's transcendental synthesis (which allowed for the possibility of experience) as it provides some landmarks in relation to which we may be better placed to see what Heidegger is proposing.

Kant's business in *The Critique of Pure Reason* was to discover the limits of the understanding such that what was fair game and what was out of bounds in the realms of thinking and knowing could be laid bare.

²⁵ Ibid., p.174.

Conceptual understanding was found to be both empirical and pure. Empirical concepts were garnered from experience, from whence we derive, for example, the concept 'dog'. They are as much derived from experience as applicable to it. Such concepts regulate our intuitions. Pure concepts, for example 'causality', 'substance', 'number', are not, on the other hand, derivable from experience. Moreover, Kant essayed to show that such concepts were not only a priori, but also that intelligible experience must be constituted by these a priori concepts. These pure concepts that constitute the very frame of our being able to have meaningful experience stand in need of a bridge that can connect them to the content of our intuitions. An influx of intuitional content without concepts to order it would be 'blind', a blizzard of uninformative and formless debris. By the same token, a great scaffolding of pure categories without content would remain forever 'empty'. Intelligible experience, Kant saw, requires a synthesis.

Kant's solution for the original synthesis of content and concept can be seen in his section on the schematism. This section is placed at the beginning of the 'Analytic of Principles' and provides an account of the application of the categories of the understanding in experience. Herein, a transcendental schema is shown as being a condition under which the pure category may acquire the possibility of application. The schema thus limits the concept such that it may be applied in a determinate way within the 'inner sense' of the experiencing being.

Regarding empirical concepts, the derivation and application of a schema is fairly unproblematic. The concept 'dog', to use one of Kant's examples, is

already empirically derived, hence there is a pre-existent homogeneity obtaining between the concept and intuition. But this kind of likeness is more problematic when it comes to relating pure concepts to intuitions. Such concepts are not already abstracted from any intuited given, they themselves pre-exist such intuitions, arising from the understanding alone. Kant shows that these concepts reach apply to the world by virtue of a *tertium quid* between the intellectual and sensible: the mediating representation of the transcendental schema which links the heterogeneous spheres. The schema is universal, like the category, yet it is also capable of being present to intuition. Thus with the schema we can 'perceive' meaning. The schemata are images produced for the intuition's grasp. Kant says that this 'schematism of our understanding' is an 'art concealed in the depths of the human soul' (B180/A141)²⁶. Originating out of some faculty of image production, the original synthesis is thus thought to occur within the faculty of the imagination. Without it, thought's grip would slip from the world. For Kant, the imagination plays a figurative role in experience. It pre-reflectively and spontaneously pre-figures the original and possible structures of what is experienced and then consciously understands the constituted world along the lines of these categories. The imagination's figurative function is accordingly, 'blind but indispensable'.

In his first edition of the *Critique*, Kant clearly described the locus of the transcendental schematism as within the imagination, with the imagination being a third faculty apart from the intuition and the understanding,

²⁶ CPR.

yet connecting both. In his second version, Kant folds the imagination back into the faculty of the understanding. Heidegger interprets this change as Kant's 'recoil' from the import of what he had put forward. If the imagination were to be conceived as a more original source of the synthesis of experience, then reason's claim for dominion over experience would be shaken.

It would seem from the foregoing cursory survey of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental schematism that Heidegger gives 'moodedness' the role of figuration that Kant gives to the faculty of imagination. Like the imagination, the fundamental existential of attunement must already have a foot in the understanding if 'attunement always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed.'²⁷ Unlike the Kantian imagination, attunement is not to be conceived as some dark art hidden in our deepest recesses; Heidegger emphasises that moods are misconceived when taken as something psychical or even as something 'inner' which is then projected after the manner of the projected schematised concepts. Mood first arises from being-in-the-world as a mode of that very being. Indeed, one comes closer to Heidegger's conception when the modes of being-in-the-world are seen as its moods, and vice versa. Da-sein's being-in-the-world is not the self, neither is it some constituting interiority. Da-sein's being-in-the-world is the self-given ek-sisting in a situation out of facticity and towards possibility. Mood discloses our situation and our situatedness insofar as its attunement lets things matter to us. It discloses our 'thrownness', the facts

²⁷ *BT*, p.182.

of our existent situation that have already been interpreted by others, insofar as it discloses the 'that it is' of Da-sein. Da-sein is revealed as being its 'there'. Da-sein is its there as being-in-the-world. Attunement also discloses to Da-sein 'that it has to be'; that being which is being-in-the-world is something that is necessarily taken on in existence. When Heidegger says that '[m]ood assails', he says that, 'it comes neither from "without" nor from "within", but rises from being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being.'²⁸ It is mood that discloses being-in-the-world as such and first makes possible a directing of oneself toward something such that it is encountered.

Encountering something is therefore primarily circumspective. Here one recalls that for Heidegger, the initial encounter with things (*pragmata*) is pragmatic. Things are grasped first as handy, or ready-to-hand, such that they afford various uses. Things taken as such always refer to other things such that, by an unlimited semiosis, they refer to the totality of things and projects as a whole. Their significance is relative to instrumental purposes, which purposes ultimately relate back to Da-sein's concern for its own being, that which it is and has to be in the mode of existence. Encountering something is not having a sensation or merely staring out at something. That we can encounter things means that we can be affected, that we can be moved. We can be affected only because it is existentially determined in advance that what we encounter can matter to us, insofar as we are attuned in one way or another. Merely having a sensation would

²⁸ *BT*, p.136.

not even get close to encountering something. It is 'only because the senses belong to a being with attuned being-in-the-world [that they can] be "touched" and "have a sense" for something so that what touches them shows itself in affect.'²⁹ If moods did not prefigure the disclosure of world in terms of mattering, something like an affect would never come about. What is indicated here is that an affect always has some import in terms of meaning and in terms, qualitative terms, of how I, in my situation, am affected. Heidegger thus locates the primary discovery of the world in moods.

Da-sein as understanding and interpreting

Equiprimordial with attunement, understanding constitutes the being of the 'there'. Understanding is thus a necessary mode of Da-sein, necessary because Da-sein is its there. As 'being there', Da-sein is always situated. As an existential, Heidegger does not wish us to think of understanding as one mode of cognition among others, say analysis or conceptualization. For Heidegger, all modes of cognition are derived from that primary understanding which constitutes the being of the there in general.

Precisely insofar as it understands, Da-sein is a potentiality of being. Being-in-the-world is disclosed via its projects, it is disclosed in the 'for-the-sake-of-which': this disclosure of existing being-in-the-world through the for-the-sake-of-which is what Heidegger means by original

²⁹ Ibid., p.137.

understanding. As understanding, therefore, Da-sein is always 'ahead of itself' as primarily being-possible. This means that in its situation and among its concerns and occupations, Da-sein is always concerned with things whose intelligibility is founded in terms of Da-sein's future or possible futures. 'Da-sein is always what it can be and how it is its possibility' (p. 143).

Da-sein's possibilities always concern ways of taking care of our world, our relationships with others and, internally related to these, heeding to the 'potentiality of being' that one is. This potentiality of being is no empty logical possibility. Neither is it a present constellation of contingent beings whereby one thing or another can happen. '[E]ssentially attuned, Da-sein has already got itself involved into definite possibilities'(p.144). Da-sein constantly adopts the possibilities of its being. 'Da-sein is the possibility of being free *for* its ownmost potentiality of being' (p.144).

Understanding is the being of a potentiality for being which is essentially never present, this potentiality for being is not merely objectively outstanding, it is temporal as thrown projection. Hence understanding is involved in constituting the existence of Da-sein through time. This is how Da-sein 'knows' what is going on. This knowing is no innermost self-perception; rather it belongs to the being of the there that essentially understands.

Differences in the aspects of moods in Kierkegaard and Heidegger

In a previous paper³⁰ we looked at Kierkegaard's concept of existence and

his idea that the core of this existence lies not in the individual's relation to the world and its necessities and possibilities, but in the relating to this relation itself. Kierkegaard showed the importance of the mood of despair in the relation to self and that such a mood is impossible unless the self-relation is absolutely inescapable. Were Kierkegaard's self-relation more mutable, and as such escapable, than he describes, then the individual would be incapable of despairing over not being the self he or she wants to be.

Looking now to Heidegger's presentation of existence we see how he deepened the philosophical insight into moodedness with respect to this existence. Heidegger shifted from the Kierkegaardian emphasis on subjectivity and presented the case that moods arise neither from an interior subject nor from an external world but from being-in-the-world. Importantly, Heidegger argued that moods and affectivity in general do not simply enrich being-in-the world with their qualitative textures, they are rather a transcendental necessity for being-in-the-world at all. Without moods, the world can't even begin to 'matter' and there is then no possibility of will. A pure reason could have no purchase on a world in which nothing mattered, in the sense in which something matters to us if we can be affected by it. Heidegger showed how affectivity plays a necessary and figurative role in will, in intelligence and cognition, in perception, in being in a situation, in interpretation, indeed in everything

³⁰ 'The Existential Relation of Mood and Self in Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death*', *Fukuoka University Review of Literature & Humanities*, Vol. XXXVI No. 1 (No. 140), June 2004.

that we consider to be human.

It cannot be denied that Heidegger dramatically opened up our understanding of feeling. Sartre has written that since Heidegger it is possible to think that we shall find the whole of human reality in emotion, 'since emotion is the human reality which assumes itself and which, "aroused", "directs" itself towards the world'³¹. Heidegger, with cues from Kierkegaard and Husserl, overtook the traditional intellectualist ways of thinking and sketched a view of the profound and omni-penetrating importance of affectivity in human reality. Heidegger made great advances in showing how an exploration of moodedness must be a central theme in understanding human being and also in any philosophy that aims to be grounded in ontology. With respect to the role played by moodedness in the very possibility of Da-sein or any of its instances, Heidegger's work is of the first importance. Heidegger's analyses of anxiety and of boredom are insightful explorations of how Da-sein is affected by its inextricable relations to nothingness and to time.

Kierkegaard's understanding of moods is that they are at the heart of a passionate struggle of the individual to know, choose and become his or herself, while Heidegger, while overflowing the traditional intellectualist characterizations of moods, appears to remain solely concerned with academic and metaphysical questions of ontology and knowledge. The quest for authentic existence is nevertheless a master key in Heidegger's

³¹ Sartre, J.-P., *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, [1939], p.25, 1962, London: Methuen & Co.

method of philosophizing³². Heidegger's notion of authentic existence requires a high degree of transparency concerning what and how Da-sein is. In order to help bring us closer to Heidegger's notion of transparency, we shall look first to a traditional ideal of clear-sightedness, originating from Plato and elegantly hymned by Boethius:

In dark clouds
Hidden
The stars can shed
No light.
If boisterous winds
Stir the sea
Causing a storm,
Waves once crystal
Like days serene
Soon turn opaque
And thick with mud
Prevent the eye
Piercing the water.
Streams that wander

³² Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, London: Routledge, 1996. Mulhall argues that 'the tone of spiritual fervour that many readers have detected in the book is internally related to its most central purposes, and that Heidegger makes existential demands on himself and his readers.' (Preface, p. x) This argument is supported by Heidegger's comments that authentic Da-sein has a transparent perspicuity about what it is to be Da-sein, therefore one should assume that Heidegger would have expected authentic existence to be a pre-requisite for genuine philosophizing.

From tall hills
Down descending
Often dash
Against a rock
Torn from the hillside.
If you desire
To look on truth
And follow the path
With unswerving course,
Rid yourself
Of joy and fear,
Put hope to flight,
And banish grief.
The mind is clouded
And bound in chains
Where these hold sway.³³

In this classic and compelling image of clear-sightedness, the treacherous passions must be dispelled if one is to glimpse the resplendent light of truth. Passion is described as 'boisterous wind' stirring the sea and causing the serene transparency of its waters to become thickly opaque with mud. The consciousness that would come to the light of truth is described as ridding itself of strong emotions so that it may be pure, untainted and untainting: more objective. Boethius' description of emotion calls to mind

³³ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, p. 53, trans. V. E. Watts, Penguin Books, 1980.

Sartre's references to emotion as 'clogging' the mind, rendering 'consciousness opaque to itself' like a 'yeasty tumescence'.³⁴ Sartre's point is that an emotion is not the apprehension of something exciting in and otherwise unchanged world, his references to the 'clogging' of consciousness mean that it becomes it becomes more opaque as an emotion amounts to a global transformation of consciousness, hence changing the aspect of everything consciousness intends. The traditional example of clear-sightedness given by Boethius not only notes that the stronger emotions give an opacity to consciousness, it also assumes that a consciousness free of emotion will come to see things more as they really are.

Heidegger also advises that 'we can, must and should become master of our moods'. We have already noted that Heidegger argues that even the gaze of the scientist in his or her laboratory is far from being mood-free. For Heidegger the ideal of an unattuned consciousness is utterly meaningless, *Da-sein* cares about its world, its reason is already significantly affected in one direction or another. So what does Heidegger mean by authentic existence having transparency if he does not mean that it is free from the opacity of moodedness? As Dreyfus observes, Heidegger's perspicuity 'is the furthest thing from lucid, reflective self-awareness'³⁵. This perspicuity is not one of focusing on any object in the world, neither is it one of 'inspecting a point called the "Self"³⁶, it is rather the achievement of the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world. A full disclosedness of being-in-the-

³⁴ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 388, Routledge, 1996.

³⁵ Dreyfus, H., *Being-in-the-World*, p. 194, London: MIT Press, 1999.

³⁶ *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 146.

world will include both what emotion discloses and what understanding discloses and neither disclosure will close off what is revealed by the other. This kind of transparency amounts to being fully what one is without masking or hiding from certain aspects of one's being-in-the-world. Heideggerian authenticity is an 'own-ness', an *eigentlichkeit*, such that one does not flee from or suppress constitutive elements of Da-sein by forcing a one-sided existence from being-in-the-world. Thus in authenticity one accepts what is to be Da-sein such that one's activity manifests fully and transparently what it means to be Da-sein. As an example of fundamental attunement providing an eminent disclosedness of Da-sein, Heidegger presents the mood of anxiety.

Mood as disclosing authentic existence

In proposing that anxiety is eminently disclosive of Da-sein, Heidegger is saying that anxiety brings Da-sein before itself in such a way that Da-sein cannot remain simultaneously entangled in the world or in the they-self. In this understanding of the disclosive import of anxiety, we can see that Heideggerian perspicuity is indeed far from the dispassionate clarity of vision exemplified in Boethius' poem.

Heidegger observes that most of the time we are absorbed in 'the they' and in the cares of the world. The 'they' (in German Heidegger writes *das Man*) refers to an impersonal identity of convention in accordance with which one does what one does in the way that one does it. Heidegger's concept of *das*

Man refers to the quotidian de-centring of oneself whereby one acts as *one of them*. In this mode of existence, Da-sein flees from itself as an authentic (*eigentlich*) potentiality for being itself. Such a mode of being leads precisely away from Da-sein and is thus a way of being Da-sein that is far from transparent. Inauthentic Da-sein is still disclosed to itself, otherwise it would not be able to turn and flee, but this disclosure is not a perspicuous grasping of itself. Heidegger notes that anxiety (as distinct from fear, which always has its specific object) is anxious about something indefinite³⁷. In this indefiniteness, specific entities in the world cease to become relevant. It is being-in-the-world as such that obtrudes in anxiety and in the face of which one is anxious. It is in anxiety that we face the world as world because this mood allows the phenomenon of world to be reached from under the foreground of this object or that object and from this project or that project. Anxiety thus takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself in terms of the public way of interpreting things by throwing Da-sein back upon itself. In this situation, Da-sein is radically individuated and faced with itself. What is revealed in anxiety is Da-sein's own potentiality for being free to choose and grasp itself³⁸. This disclosure also allows Da-sein to see the inauthenticity of the 'they' and of being entangled in the world, which are now capable of being seen as ways of losing oneself.

Heidegger does not remain only with the focus and direction of anxiety in his analysis; he also attends to what it feels like to be anxious. He notes

³⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 186.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

that anxiety has an 'uncanny' (Ger: *unheimlich*) feeling. In accord with his argument that feelings are intelligently perceptive, Heidegger presses his readers to ask what the feeling of anxiety can tell us. He notes that anxiety's uncanny tone makes familiar objects seem strangely distant so that we have the feeling of not being at home. 'Everyday familiarity collapses'³⁹. Attending to this feeling, Heidegger is then in a position to understand that average everydayness is a flight into the tranquillized familiarity of publicness and its modes of interpreting and is a flight away from the uncanniness that attends Da-sein as being-in-the-world entrusted to itself in its own being. This anxiety may then arise from the most harmless of situations, threatening the cosy security of average everydayness: it arises with the understanding that one is freely given over to oneself, that one is self possessed and self responsible. In this respect Heidegger is in agreement with Kierkegaard: that in anxiety we face, with vertiginous apprehension, our freedom.

Heidegger tries to grasp the constituents of Da-sein in their simplicity and is trying to let them speak for themselves. Or rather Heidegger is trying to understand what he feels without complicating the issue or evading the heart of the matter. In anxiety one's being-in-the-world comes to the fore as entities recede in significance and lose the tones, hues, values and weights that have been conferred on them by what Heidegger calls the 'average everydayness' of 'the they'. Facing its own being-in-the-world, Da-sein confronts itself. As care, as the being who in its very being is

³⁹ Ibid., p. 189.

concerned about being, Da-sein cannot shift its attention onto entities nearby and close to hand while it is in the pure and heightened pitch of anxiety. In anxiety, Da-sein is aware that its concerns are for its own being and that it alone can, must and does (directly or indirectly) assume full responsibility for itself. This responsibility cannot be refused. The existential choice is not whether or not to be given over to oneself: the choice is to be oneself authentically or inauthentically. Unlike the mood of fear, whereby one is afraid *of*, say, the dog and *for* oneself, in anxiety one is before one's very being in the world and thus anxious for oneself and before oneself. Anxiety has the power as a transcendental existential structure to radically individuate Da-sein in its total and utter being; a being that is to end in death. The nothingness that encircles Da-sein is accessible through anxiety. Anxiety as a fundamental attunement is, par excellence, shown not simply to provide a nuance to existence but to provide the very access to existence as such. This access is made in the way in which fear and trembling constitute an access to the sacred or the holy for Rudolf Otto⁴⁰. In the mood of anxiety are disclosed Da-sein's concern for existence and its being as being-in-the-world. Through anxiety, this concerned and individuated being-in-the-world is also revealed as what is at stake in the possibilities of being Da-sein authentically or inauthentically.

This theme is one of Kierkegaard's. Under the pseudonyms of Judge William and Anti-Climacus, urges 'Choose yourself!' But the options given do not make this seem much like a choice. One cannot successfully choose

⁴⁰ Otto, R., *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey, Oxford University Press, 1968.

not to be oneself, because one is oneself. One cannot choose to be another, even though in despair one may wish to be another. But the seemingly paradoxical imperative is advice that knows that if one does not choose oneself, then one is not authentically his or herself. To be authentically a self is to relate to one's situation, moods and actions with the utmost seriousness and to be aware that in choosing, one is either choosing oneself or one is not choosing at all but merely playing, evading oneself, putting off the choice. To be oneself without despair or to evade this possibility by means of dispersal into the public way of interpreting things, or by escape into fantastic flights of imagination or into closeted fatalism or determinism: the difference between being oneself authentically and being inauthentic is a willo-the-wisp that is so difficult to discern and yet one which continues to haunt philosophy. It is a difference access to which can only primarily come non-intellectually for Kierkegaard (through despair) and Heidegger (through anxiety).

In the service of philosophy, Heidegger went further than Kierkegaard in showing that moods first give us access to a world and how they initially get the world to matter to us and continue to keep it mattering. Both philosophers worked to impress upon their readers that the very feeling of a mood or attunement actually means or discloses something. Kierkegaard and Heidegger should be considered as champions of a perspicuity that goes beyond the clear-sightedness of discounting affectivity as a cloud that filters out the pure light of vision. Existential perspicuity is a transparency that is comprehensive, one that owns up to what it is that goes to make up what we are. Heidegger's transcendental deduction of affectivity

from the very possibility of experience attempted to prove affect-less being-in-the-world as much of an impossibility as space-less geometry or time-less causality. Heidegger never attempted a complete deduction of the affects. For example, Sartre comments that, 'Heidegger [...] never makes the slightest allusion to [sexuality] in his existential analytic with the result that his Da-sein appears to us as asexual'⁴¹. Is it impossible that sexual desire is an existential component of being-with? Of course, *Being and Time* would never have progressed as far as it did if Heidegger were to have attempted a much fuller list and analysis of attunements. Within the scope of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's task concerning affectivity was to show how an understanding of being originates from an attuned access to being in the mode of care. A major difference between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is that for Heidegger, fundamental attunements, especially that of anxiety, reveal Da-sein to itself as being-in-the-world and hence allow the individual to come to an authentic self-possession or to flee into inauthenticity; whereas for Kierkegaard, moods play a much more active roll in the call to authentic selfhood. That is to say, Kierkegaard sees moods as positively directing the individual towards authentic self-possession, whereas for Heidegger certain moods allow access to a transparent grasp of oneself, but they do not constitute a positive call to authentic selfhood.

For Kierkegaard, despair is the desolate pain of refusing to be oneself. Anxiety is the dizzy experience of freedom that makes us aware that

⁴¹ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p.383, trans. Hazel Barnes, Routledge, 1996.

perhaps we do not know or acknowledge who we are and what we ought to be doing. Melancholy results from self-evasion, the flight from self-affirmation into dispersion. Irony is petulant rebellion against the world's broken promises of fulfillment, a breaking away from immersion in the world⁴². Each mood for Kierkegaard is a push, a pull or a call towards transforming one's basic outlook such that one may come to a position of greater perspicuity with respect to oneself. In the previous paper in this series we looked in detail at the mood of despair and how it brings the individual to a position where the question of being oneself authentically is inescapable. In Heidegger moods have a profound disclosive importance with regard to authentic selfhood but not a more dramatically positive and urgent role to play in transparent self-possession as that found in Kierkegaard's authorship. Not only does Kierkegaard show the urgency of moods he shows them as leading towards authentic selfhood and this authentic self as being based in its constituting power (God). While Heidegger has a model of authenticity that demands the individual be transparent to him or herself, he does not describe the mood as having to be worked through towards a transformed and higher self, as does Kierkegaard. For Heidegger, it is enough that one does not flee into the comfort of the they in the face of dizzying fundamental attunements in order to grasp transparently what it is to be Da-sein in its fullest disclosedness. Not surprisingly, it appears that, according to Heidegger's understanding of authenticity, one of the most authentic ways of being self-perspicuous Da-sein is to write a book like *Being and Time* on the quest

⁴² McCarthy, V. A., *The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1978.

for the retrieval of the meaning of being via an analysis of Da-sein itself.

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