

# Reframing the New Normal in U.S.-Japan-China Relations

Stephanie A. Weston \*

## Summary

This paper analyzes what is the new normal in U.S.-Japan-China relations post 9/11 in the Asia Pacific to present and how this informs their trilateral relations related to political as well as economic and security shifts. Finally, the paper concludes that all three powers are pro-actively reframing the new normal to protect their national interests in the region while creating new platforms for cooperation to avoid conflict.

## Introduction

Although the U.S.-Japan-China triangle is not institutionalized, given the hard and soft capacities of all three nations, it is one of the key defacto asymmetrical triangles in the Asia Pacific region. Important milestones related to the three states since 9/11 include both the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the PLA (1949); the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the

---

\* Professor, Faculty of Law, Fukuoka University

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. of America (1960); the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Sino-Japanese normalized relations (1972) and the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of U.S.-China normalized relations (1979).

Presently, both Sino-U.S. relations and U.S.-Japan relations are stronger than Sino-Japan relations. And while the U.S., as the predominant power in the region, is still the pivot in the triangle, the impact of China's rise on the U.S. and Japan is growing. However, the U.S.-Japan alliance/global partnership remains the strongest of the three bilateral relations.

Since U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield (1979-1988) called the U.S.-Japan "the most important bilateral relationship bar now," this expression has remained a stock phrase in official statements over the years. Present Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, however, has said concerning U.S.-China relations- "It is as important as any bilateral relationship in the world." <sup>1</sup> At the same time, the U.S. - China as well as the Sino-Japanese relationships are becoming increasingly interdependent economically and characterized by cooperation over a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues. Comparatively, there is more conflict between the U.S. and China as well as China and Japan versus the U.S. and Japan. However, U.S.-Japan alliance/global partnership, which is based on common values and strategic goals, is not always aligned on all issues. Some of those issues include the handling of North Korea, different aspects

---

<sup>1</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century-Remarks* (Washington, D.C., Department of State, 2011),1, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/154653.htm>.

of TPP and the relocation of the Futenma Air Base.

Clearly, all three powers are increasing their respective political influence, economic power as well as security capacities in their respective national interests. At the same time, while China's economic and military power increases in the region, the U.S. and Japan are fighting overwhelming national debt. And the U.S. is gradually pulling out of a second Middle East war in Afghanistan. In addition, all three states are either facing upcoming national elections or leadership shifts later this year.

Given these trends, all three powers are also expanding their bilateral, mini-lateral and multilateral participation in the region. For example, since 9/11, there has been an increase in new trilaterals as well as a strengthening of pre-existing ones. Moreover, the U.S. and Japan have called for an institutionalized trilateral relationship with China.

In light of the above background, this paper analyzes what is the new normal in U.S.-Japan-China relations post 9/11 in the Asia Pacific. It then looks at how this new normal informs the three powers' relations related to political as well as economic and security shifts. Finally, this paper concludes that all three powers are pro-actively reframing the new normal to protect their national interests in the region while creating new platforms for cooperation to avoid conflict.

### **Political Shifts**

2012 is not only a year of political shifts for U.S., Japan and China leaderships respectively but also for South Korea, Taiwan and Russia. U.S. will hold Presidential elections in November. And China's fifth generation

of leaders headed by Xi Jinping will soon be in charge of the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest economy. Japan too most likely will see another Prime Minister at the helm this autumn. In South Korea, President Lee Myung Bak's conservative Saenuri Party won the legislative elections this year. Also after next year's elections, Park Geun-hye, the party's majority leader, will probably become the new president and 'move away from Lee Myung Bak's hardline stance toward North Korea.'<sup>2</sup>

Taiwan has re-elected Ma ying-jeou as its president, which bodes well for peaceful cross strait relations and continued economic integration with the mainland. And Russian Presidential elections, held in March of this year, returned Premier Vladimir Putin for a third term as President. The former President Dimitry Medvedev once again became Russia's premier in May of this year. And significantly, since the 1990s, Russia and China have continued to build up their strategic partnership<sup>3</sup> but "remain competitors in several important areas like arms' market, space technology and access to oil and gas resources in Central Asia."<sup>4</sup>

Another very important transition for N.E. Asia is the passing

---

<sup>2</sup> Kim, Jack, "Seoul must change to "trustpolitik" with North, says Park," *Reuters*, August 23, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/23/us-korea-north-park-idUSTRE77M14Y20110823>.

<sup>3</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *True Partners? How Russia & China See Each Other* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012), 1-48, <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/rp-065-4622.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Masashi Nishihara, "Asian Perspectives in 2011: China's "Coercive" Diplomacy leads to new Power Alignments," *RIPS Policy Perspectives*, no. 11 (2011): par 18, [http://www.rips.or.jp/research/RIPS\\_Policy\\_Perspectives\\_11.pdf](http://www.rips.or.jp/research/RIPS_Policy_Perspectives_11.pdf).

of North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011. Along with this shift came the succession of his 29 year old son – Kim Jong Un, whose capacity as a leader is still relatively untested. However, soon after the son's ascension, he concluded an agreement with the U.S. (2/29/12) about the inspection of nuclear facilities in exchange for food. Subsequently, North Korea announced its plan to launch a so called 'weather observation satellite for peaceful purposes.'<sup>5</sup>

North Korea indeed launched an Unha 3 rocket with the satellite on April 13, 2012, which failed after takeoff. As the launch violated U.N. Resolutions 1718 and 1874,<sup>6</sup> the U.N. increased its sanctions against and the U.S. suspended its agreement with North Korea respectively. Presently, the North Korean situation is at an impasse, given as well the suspended Six Party Talks.

Against this backdrop, the new normal in U.S.-Japan-China concerning political leadership is important for the future dynamics of the trilateral relations as well as for the region. In addition, the political leadership of each country is forging a new normal among the three countries

---

<sup>5</sup> Ed Flanagan, "NBC space expert on North Korea Satellite launch: It's not a Military Missile.but it's darn close'," *msnbc.com*, April 2012, [http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/\\_news/2012/04/09/11101174-nbc-space-expert-on-north-korea-satellite-launch-its-not-a-military-missile-but-its-darn-close?lite](http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/04/09/11101174-nbc-space-expert-on-north-korea-satellite-launch-its-not-a-military-missile-but-its-darn-close?lite).

<sup>6</sup> "The resolutions very clearly and unequivocally require North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program including the conducting of launches." Victoria Nuland, *North Korean Announcement of Missile Launch* (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Dept. of State, 2012), 1, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185910.htm>.

which could be a platform for cooperation or conflict depending on their respective policies and actions.

From the two administrations of George W. Bush to the present administration of Barack Obama, there have been some political shifts which clearly set a different tone for U.S.-Japan-China relations. Post 9/11, President George W. Bush aggressively attacked Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 while calling on allies, friends and others to step up their actions in the so called “War on Terror.” Throughout his two terms, he continued as well to enhance bilateral and multilateral countermeasures against terrorism. However, President Bush’s neo conservative agenda to project a strong America, if necessary through unilateral action, generated strong criticism within the global community.

While reaffirming the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, President George W. Bush readjusted President Bill Clinton’s (1992-2000) lean towards China. At the beginning of the George W. Bush presidency, LDP Diet member Junichiro Koizumi became the Prime Minister of Japan. The convergence of their outlooks regarding regional and global security helped to strengthen the alliance for the war on terrorism. At the same time, the logistical responsibilities of the SDF, in and outside of the Asia Pacific, expanded due to new security legislation enacted during the Koizumi era. And the Japanese 2004 National Defense Program Outline later reflected the government’s promotion of a proactive Japan in the global community.

While strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, alternatively the administration of George W. Bush viewed China as a strategic competitor. However, the same administration later emphasized a “candid, constructive and cooperative relationship” with China.<sup>7</sup> It also called on China to be a

“responsible stakeholder” in the global system.

During the George W. Bush era, Sino-U.S. relations continued to be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. For example, Chinese leadership under President Jiang Zemin as well as President Hu Jintao was supportive of the “War on Terror” to some degree. China cooperated specifically with the U.S., for example, ‘by condemning the attacks of 9/11, expressing its sympathies, sharing intelligence on terrorist groups, following financial flows of terrorists and strengthening some law enforcement links.’<sup>8</sup> In 2006, Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao’s development of the new Strategic Economic Dialogue also exemplified Sino-U.S. cooperation. Specifically, the SED aimed for government high level discussions related to “long term strategic issues in bilateral trade relations including environmental protection, sustainable development, investment, financial services, civil aviation and food safety.”<sup>9</sup>

Alternatively, during the G.W. Bush administrations, some of Sino-U.S. clashes involved a collision between a U.S. Navy E P-3 reconnaissance plane and a PLA naval F8 fighter; denial of a Hong Kong port visit by an American aircraft carrier battle group; the American sale of arms to

---

<sup>7</sup> *englishpeople.com.cn*, “Bush’s Visit to China Reaffirms Constructive Ties: U.S. Official,” February 28, 2002, [englishpeople.com.cn/200202/28/eng20020228\\_91146.ashtml](http://englishpeople.com.cn/200202/28/eng20020228_91146.ashtml).

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Scobell, “Chinese Foreign Policy and the War on Terror,” *Terrorism Monitor* no. 2 (2005): par. 6, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=431](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=431).

<sup>9</sup> *www.chinaview.cn*, “Backgrounder: China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue,” June 17, 2008, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/17/content\\_8387724.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/17/content_8387724.htm).

Taiwan and trade violations. Meanwhile as the U.S. became entangled in two Middle Eastern wars, America focused less on the Asia Pacific region while China's soft and hard power increased. Finally, at the end of his presidency, President G.W. Bush handed over a legacy of two wars as well as a troubled economy to his successor-President Barack Obama.

President Obama, while trying to restore the U.S. economy, has tried to burnish the image of the U.S. abroad. He has also taken on a more cooperative vs. unilateral foreign policy approach. While achieving U.S. complete U.S. combat troop withdrawal from Iraq in December of 2011, the administration is also working towards the same in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. And the Obama administration is now emphasizing the renewed focus of the U.S. on the Asia Pacific. This is in line with the administration's call for an U.S. Pacific Century and its smart power<sup>10</sup> strategies in the region.

Since President Obama assumed office, he has already interacted with two Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime ministers – Yasuo Fukuda (9/24/07-9/24/08) and Taro Aso (9/24/08-9/16/09) and three Democratic Party of Japan prime ministers- Yukio Hatoyama (9/16/09-6/8/10); Naoto Kan (6/8/10-9/2/11); and Yoshihiro Noda (9/2/11-present). Throughout the leadership shifts in Japan, however, the U.S.-Japan alliance

---

<sup>10</sup> Smart power combines hard and soft power as an integrated strategy. Hard power, “the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might.” Soft power “arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies.” Joseph A. Nye Jr. “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 119, no. 2 (2004): par. 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20202345.pdf>.



as the “cornerstone of peace, security and stability in the Asia Pacific region”<sup>11</sup> has continually been emphasized by President Obama and the leadership of 5 different Japanese administrations.

With the changeover from long standing LDP leadership to the first DPJ administration under PM Hatoyama, there were frictions between the administrations of Obama and Hatoyama. This was due in part to the reversal of a prior LDP agreement to relocate the Futenma air base from Naha to Henoko within Okinawa. Later Hatoyama reconfirmed the original relocation agreement but failed to budge local authorities regarding the transfer. Moreover, PM Hatoyama, at first, seemed supportive of an East Asian Community that excluded the U.S. These issues helped fuel mistrust between allies.

After PM Yukio Hatoyama stepped down, his successor - PM Naoto Kan is strived to rebuild good relations with the U.S. These efforts along with U.S. military support through Operation Tomodachi<sup>12</sup> as well as other

---

<sup>11</sup> Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future* (Tokyo: PM of Japan and his Cabinet, 2012),1, [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/diplomatic/201204/30usa\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/diplomatic/201204/30usa_e.html).

<sup>12</sup> ‘Operation Tomodachi (3/11-4/8/11) was the U.S. Armed Forces operation that provided disaster relief following the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown in northeastern Japan.’ “The U.S. forces responded with air, sea and ground capability and expertise as well as military equipment.” Ryan Zielonka, “Amidst Trial, Ties that Bind: Enduring Strength in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” National Bureau of Research Brief (2011): par. 1, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121>. U.S. Department of Defense, *Commander Accepts Award on Operation Tomodachi* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011), 1, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66097>.

initiatives during the triple disasters in Northeast Japan, which started March 11, 2011, helped strengthen the alliance. This cooperation also created a more positive image of the U.S. military in Japan. Subsequently, during the PM Noda's state visit to the U.S. (April 2012), President Obama and PM Noda stressed the common strategies of the alliance/global partnership in the Asia Pacific.

As for China, the Obama administration, in spite of conflicts with the PRC, emphasizes 'a positive cooperative comprehensive' relationship. Moreover, the welcome given to President Hu Jintao during his U.S. state visit (2009) exemplified the treatment of China as an equal. At that time, Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao created The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S& ED),<sup>13</sup> building on the former SED.

At the same time, however, critics saw President Obama's first visit to China and other meetings held between the powers as displaying too much deference to China, for example, over issues of the environment, currency and human rights. Gradually, the U.S. has assumed a stronger stance towards China. Bilateral frictions, throughout 2010, were high especially due to an 'arms sales to Taiwan, USS George Washington first visit to Vietnam; exercises by the U.S. and S. Korea in the Yellow Sea in response

---

<sup>13</sup> The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was established by President Obama and Chinese President Hu in April 2009. It represents the highest level bilateral forum to discuss a broad range of issues between the two nations. U.S. Department of the Treasury, *U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 2012), 1, <http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/china.aspx>.

to an attack by North Korea on Yeonpyeong, a South Korean island.’

<sup>14</sup> Some other conflicts from the beginning of the present administration to now include the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, a surveillance ship by Chinese vessels; trade frictions; the undervalued *renminbi*; regulation of greenhouse emissions; Iran’s nuclear ambitions; President Obama’s meeting with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the asylum case of blind Chinese activist - Chen Guangcheng. In addition, U.S. affirmation of ‘the Senkaku Islands falling within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ was another source of conflict.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. assertiveness towards China is also tempered by potential damages from any fall out between the top two economies. At the same time, the administration’s renewed emphasis on the Asia Pacific region is related to China’s rise and the fostering of a U.S. dominated region. Meanwhile, America is investing not only in future oriented relations with China but also in stronger alliances and partnerships in the area. This U.S. regional pro-activity is a way to reshape the new normal as well in the U.S.-Japan-China triangle.

Whether President Obama can continue this forward movement during

---

<sup>14</sup> David Lai, *The U.S. and China in Power Transition* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 176-178, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1093>.

<sup>15</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Joint Press Availability with U.S. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 2010), 1, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm>.

a second term will depend on the outcome of the Presidential elections in November of 2012. Meanwhile, the administration's forward impetus on many issues, after the 2010 Congressional elections, has been impeded by the Republican majority in the House of Representatives. The road to re-election for President Obama will not be easy, given not only an over 8 % unemployment rate but also general public dissatisfaction with the slow recovery of the U.S. economy. Moreover, in spite of the Obama administration's foreign policy measures in Iraq and Afghanistan; removal of Bin Laden; collaboration with NATO partners towards the downfall of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi and enacting of EPA/FTAs, Obama's critics still say the president has weakened the U.S. position overseas.

While the U.S. shifted from the neo conservatism of G.W. Bush to the more "progressive pragmatism"<sup>16</sup> of Barack Obama, Japan also saw important political changes as well. After 9/11, PM Junichiro Koizumi (4/26/01-9/26/06) answered the Bush Administration's call for Japan to "show its flag" and "put boots on the ground" for the "War on Terrorism". At the same time, PM Koizumi's elevation of the Japanese global image built on previous legislation and U.S.-Japan bilateral declarations in the 1990s. This Japanese proactive stance also contributed towards a new normal for the Japanese Self Defense Force missions; raised public awareness regarding Japan's national security interest; and fostered a

---

<sup>16</sup> Martin S. Indyk and others, "Scoring Obama's Foreign Policy-A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History," *Foreign Affairs* May/June (2012): 29.

more balanced alliance between the U.S. and Japan.

While PM Koizumi's pushed for a "stronger Japan" politically and diplomatically, he also caused problems with China and Korea by fulfilling his campaign promise to visit the Yasukuni shrine. He did so 6 times amidst protests from these nations. Other Sino-Japanese tensions were related to the Chinese forcible seizure of North Korean asylum seekers at the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang; Taiwan; Japan's drive for a UNSC permanent seat; the Senkakus; and Chinese ships incursions into the Japanese EEZ. PM Koizumi's political actions as well as those of China led to cooler bilateral relations. Meanwhile, China did not always view favorably the build up of the U.S.-Japan alliance/global partnership.

PM Koizumi was followed by revolving prime ministers – three from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and three from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the former leading opposition party. Over these six PMs, there have also been important shifts related to the reframing of the new normal for U.S.-Japan-China in the region.

The first three PMs – Shinzo Abe (9/26/06-9/26/07); Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso headed LDP dominated coalition governments. And although PM Abe also emphasized, for example, the importance of a strong Japan on the global stage, it was difficult, to renew the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure given the large DPJ opposition in the House of Councilors.<sup>17</sup> Under this law, the Japanese participated in a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to support the multinational forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation.<sup>18</sup> Finally, a new Anti-Terrorism Special Measure was created in 2008 under PM Fukuda. Later, DPJ administration of PM Hatoyama did not renew it.

PMs Abe and Fukuda, especially tried to balance the image of a Japan which followed too closely U.S. directives during PM Koizumi's administrations. Importantly for Sino-Japan relations, PM Abe made an ice breaking trip to China (October 2006), after frosty bilateral relations under PM Koizumi. China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao then made an ice melting visit to Japan (April of 2007). Both of these visits represented positive movement regarding Sino-Japanese relations in spite of unresolved issues like territorial disputes, infringement of the Japanese EEZ and joint exploration of gas fields in the East China Sea. Moreover, China and Japan, during PM Abe's visit to China, agreed to establish a "mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests." This partnership is a platform for cooperation toward future oriented Sino-Japanese relations in spite of conflicts.

PM Fukuda further built on PM Abe's ice breaking trip to China by travelling to China (December 2007). It was then under PM Fukuda's administration that Chinese President Hu Jintao later visited Japan (May 2008)

---

<sup>17</sup> Actually, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law after various extensions expired on 11/1/06. Toshihiro Yamauchi, "SDF's Operation in the Indian Ocean," *Japan Institute of Constitutional Law* (2007): par. 1, <http://www.jicl.jp/english/related/backnumber/20080211.html>.

<sup>18</sup> "The U.S. and other coalition countries are still carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation in the Indian Ocean to prevent free movement of terrorists and their related weapons and ammunition at sea." Japanese involvement in this operation started in 2001 under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan Efforts based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/effort0510.html>.

in line with the warming up of bilateral relations. Significantly, this occurred 10 years after his predecessor - Jiang Zemin - had last visited Japan in 1998. The visit of President Hu Jintao emphasized the importance of further developing a win-win Sino-Japanese relationship. In addition, President Hu and PM Fukuda signed a Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Interests.”

Besides the focus on China, Fukuda’s administration, not only from a broader regional perspective but also in line with Japanese national interests, proposed a “synergy” between the policies of strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and the promotion of Asian diplomacy.”<sup>19</sup>

Politically, 2009 was a key year for Japan because it ushered in the first DPJ administration under PM Yukio Hatoyama. Since the Morihiro Hosokawa administration (8/9/93-4/28/94), it was the first time that the LDP fell completely out of power. The Hatoyama administration, however, did not last long. The DPJ led coalition governments of PM Kan and now of PM Noda followed.

The Hatoyama administration, while recognizing the importance of the alliance, leaned towards China. For example, PM Hatoyama pitched the creation of an East Asia Community which, excluded the U.S., to China. Moreover, Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ Secretary at that time, led an over 600 member delegation of participants including 143 DPJ lawmakers to China

---

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “International Situation and Japanese Diplomacy in 2007,” in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2008 Summary* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2008), 1, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2008/html/h1/h1\\_01.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2008/html/h1/h1_01.html).

in 2009. In spite of PM Hatoyama's favorable approach towards China, his Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada importantly stated "Japan should not give equal treatment to the U.S., its ally, and China, which has adopted a different political system from Japan."<sup>20</sup>

Although PM Hatoyama, as did the previous three PMs, avoided visiting the Yasukuni shrine, frictions still occurred with China over 'executions of four Japanese convicted of drug smuggling; the large deployment of PLA Navy warships between Okinawa's main island and Miyakojima and the pursuit by a Chinese ship of Japanese research ship in the Japanese claimed EEZ.'<sup>21</sup>

PM Hatoyama was followed by PM Kan, who as emphasized earlier, worked to restore good U.S.-Japan relations. He also strived to improve Sino-Japanese relations as well in the aftermath of the fishing boat incident in the Senkakus (September 2010). After that incident, PM Kan and President Hu Jintao met formally for the first time on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Yokohama, Japan (November 2010) and expressed their commitment to positive relations. In addition, the Japanese Ambassador to China visited Nanking (December 2010) to restore good relations.

PM Kan administration had to face triple disasters – a large scale

---

<sup>20</sup> James J. Przystup, "Japan China Relations: All's Well that Ends Well," *Comparative Connections* 12, no. 1 (2010): par. 3, [http://csis.org/files/publication/1001qjapan\\_china.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/1001qjapan_china.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> James J. Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Troubled Waters to Calm Seas," *Comparative Connections* (2010): par. 1, [http://csis.org/files/publication/1003qjapan\\_china.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/1003qjapan_china.pdf).



earthquake as well as *tsunami* and the meltdown of a nuclear plant in N.E. Japan (March 11, 2011). Later PM Kan resigned due to criticisms regarding his administration's handling of the crisis. At the same time, the disasters served as a platform to improve strained Sino-Japan relations as well as enhance U.S.-Japan forces' inter-operability in time of crisis.

PM Noda, who took over the reins of government from PM Kan, is still dealing with the aftermath of 3.11. After the breakdown in DPJ governance regarding 3.11, Noda is trying to restore the confidence of citizens in the central government. At the same time, PM Noda has reached out to both the U.S. and China. With the U.S., he has expressed an interest in the TPP negotiations and worked towards breaking the impasse over relocation of the Futenma air base. Subsequently, prior to Noda's first formal visit to the U.S. in April 2012, the two powers announced the "delinking" of the transfer of 9,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa and the relocation of the Futenma base issue. And during the Noda state visit, both governments released a *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future*.<sup>22</sup> The two leaders, at the same time, announced as well as various initiatives related to the 'use of civil nuclear power, energy innovation, critical materials research and development, global supply chain security, cyber and space cooperation.'<sup>23</sup>

PM Noda too has continued Japan's proactive stance towards

---

<sup>22</sup> The White House, *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012), 1, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/30/united-states-japan-joint-statement-shared-vision-future>.

China to build up positive relations. He met with President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Honolulu (November 2011) and emphasized areas for future cooperation. Significantly for the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Japan China relations (2012), PM Noda visited China (December 2011). During his official trip, he met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and announced 6 initiatives to strengthen the bilateral relationship. These initiatives, which echoed points stressed by PM Noda during his meeting with President Hu Jintao in November 2011, are as follows: ‘enhance mutual political trust in the political area; promote cooperation for making the E. China Sea a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship; foster Japan-China Cooperation in the Wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake; grade up of mutually beneficial economic relations; encourage mutual understanding between people in both countries as well as strengthen dialogue and cooperation on regional and global issues.’

<sup>24</sup> At the same time, both Japan and China have also been strengthening their ties to other key players in Asia through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

While both the U.S. and Japan are experiencing a weakening of their top leadership due to general public dissatisfaction with administration

---

<sup>23</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperative Initiatives* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2012), 1-6, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact\\_Sheet\\_en.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact_Sheet_en.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-People's Republic of China Summit Meeting (Summary)* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), 1, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meeting1112.html>.

policies; weak economies and or upcoming elections, China is on the cusp of transition from its 4<sup>th</sup> generation leaders under Hu Jintao to its 5<sup>th</sup> generation leaders under heir apparent Xi Jinping, China's present vice president. And the present Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang will probably become the next premier of China. These leaders along with other 5<sup>th</sup> generation leaders will represent the balancing of two factions. Specifically, Xi Jinping is aligned with the "Princelings Party" and the Shanghai Clique.<sup>25</sup> This faction, which is closely associated with Jiang Zemin, supports moving ahead on China's economic modernization while recognizing existing social disparities.<sup>26</sup> The second faction—the "China Communist Youth League Faction" or "Tuanpai," which is closely aligned with President Hu Jintao, is more focused on a "harmonious society" and "scientific economic development."<sup>27</sup> These factions will need to work together smoothly to keep China on track domestically and globally.

---

<sup>25</sup> "The Princeling Party draws its strength primarily from the children of revolutionary era senior CCP officials. The Shanghai Clique draws its strength from officials with experiences in China's coastal provinces." John Dotson, *The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Emerging Next Generation Leaders* (Washington, D.C.:USCC, 2012), 6, [http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC\\_Staff\\_Report\\_Rising\\_Leadershipinthe\\_CCP\\_\(March%202012\).pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC_Staff_Report_Rising_Leadershipinthe_CCP_(March%202012).pdf).

<sup>26</sup> "This second group is grounded in supporters of current CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao. Many of these officials have direct experience working in the CCP nationwide youth organization, from which the faction draws its name. They tend to share experience working in China's poorer, inland provinces as well as experience in "Party Affairs" work such as propaganda, personnel administration and the "united front" management of labor, ethnic and religious organizations." Ditto.

Presently, President Hu Jintao is Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He also heads the Central Military Commission (CMC). If all proceeds well, Xi Jinping should become the CCP Secretary General in the fall of this year and then President of China in 2013. How soon Xi Jinping will be able to consolidate all three positions remains to be seen. Importantly, Xi Jinping visited Japan, South Korea, Myanmar and Cambodia in 2009 soon after DPJ Secretary General Ozawa led his large delegation to China that same December. This visit was significant for the Chinese leader to foster deeper ties with the first ever DPJ led Japanese government. Xi Jinping also visited the U.S. (February 2012), returning a visit made by Vice President Biden (August 2011). This return visit also served as an excellent opportunity for Xi Jinping to build on U.S.-China relations and for U.S. leaders to size up China's next President.

Since 9/11, China, in spite of differences with both the U.S. and Japan, has cooperated with them respectively over a wide variety of security and economic areas. China, at the same time, is pro-actively creating its own spheres of influence in the region without the U.S. through ASEAN+3; previously the East Asia Summit<sup>28</sup> and Shanghai Cooperative Organization.

---

<sup>27</sup> "The Scientific Outlook on Development takes development as its essence, putting people first as the core, comprehensive balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement and overall consideration as its fundamental approach." China.org.cn, *Hu's Report at 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress- Hold High the Great banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All* (Beijing: china.org.cn, 2007), III, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm#3>.

China's growing hard and soft power gives it the opportunity to reframe not only the new normal in the region but also the world's perception of its rise. At the same time, China's reframing of the new normal includes protection of "core interests," namely, 'national security, promotion of sustainable development and national sovereignty.'<sup>29</sup> In addition, as China's voice grows in the region, the U.S. and Japan will find some difficulties in pushing their respective regional agendas. Political disputes between China and Japan as well as the U.S. and China over economic, security and or human rights issues have grown post 9/11. Political conflicts related to China's key national interests also continue to easily upset either bilateral relationship while China seeks its own balance between economic development and regime survival. Repeated visits by PM Koizumi to Yasukuni shrine or the sale of arms by the U.S. to Taiwan (2010) clearly showed this tendency. In the former case, the visits contributed to the lack of a state visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Japan. They also led to the suspension of high level military exchanges. In the latter case as well, high level Sino-U.S. military exchanges were suspended for several months.

---

<sup>28</sup> "As of 2011, both the U.S. and Russia have joined the East Asia Summit. The East Asia Summit, whose center is ASEAN+3, is a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia." Regional Economic Policy Support Facility, Phase II, *About the East Asia Summit* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: REPSF), 1, <http://www.asean.org/aadcp/repsf/abouteastasiasummit.html>.

<sup>29</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "National Defense Policy," in *China's National Defense in 2010* (Beijing: State Council, 2011), 1, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm).

Although there will be political shifts at the top in China, China's pursuit of a "mutually beneficial partnership based on common strategic interests" with Japan and a "positive, cooperative and comprehensive" relationship with the U.S. are needed bridges for China's rise. The Chinese political leadership too will continue the managing of internal discontent, economic bubbles and outside access to keep on track. China's pro-activity in the Asia Pacific must also avoid misperceptions by the U.S. and Japan regarding its actions.

Presently, the new political normal for U.S.-Japan-China relations is the proactive expansion of political influence and linkages in the region. Their respective reframing of the political normal inside and outside of the triangle involves bilateral and multilateral mechanisms as well as other tools such as development assistance; trade agreements and CBMs.

Beyond existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, both the U.S. and Japan have pushed for an institutionalized trilateral among the three powers. Since 9.11 as well new trilateral frameworks in the region have increased. Some examples include U.S.-Australia-Japan (2005); Russia, China and India (2006); U.S.-India-Japan (2011); and China-Pakistan-Afghanistan (2012). In addition, the strengthening of both the U.S.-ROK-Japan and the China-ROK-Japan trilateral frameworks has also occurred.

And now, there is a call by the U.S. for a U.S.-China-India trilateral. Moreover, China, Japan and South Korea launched a permanent secretariat in Korea as of September 1, 2011 to further advance their trilateral relations.<sup>30</sup>

The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee's 2011 Joint Statement, moreover, emphasized strongly this kind of trilateral cooperation for

traditional and non-traditional security issues.<sup>31</sup> The same joint statement also stresses “building trust among the U.S. Japan and China.” Finally, the statement also mentioned efforts to promote trilateral and multilateral cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and other operations as the circumstances allow through joint exercises and mutual logistics support.”<sup>32</sup> All are areas where trilateral U.S., Japan and China relations could further blossom.

While regional security trends have made the creation of other trilaterals easier, given the political shifts later this year, China has no real incentive now to quickly forge such a trilateral with the U.S. and Japan. Other impediments to quickly creating this trilateral include current frictions as well as trust issues between the U.S. and China and Japan and China; different approaches to common interests and competing strategies for regional influence. In the past, the exclusion of South Korea was also a non-starter for this kind of U.S.-Japan-China formal framework.<sup>33</sup> As China rises, it may continue to resist official engagement in such a trilateral.

While both the U.S. and Japan realize that China’s rise is inevitable, both powers along with this trend, are pro-actively reframing the political

---

<sup>30</sup> *The Korea Herald*, “Trilateral Secretariat officially opens in Seoul,” September 27, 2011, <http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20110927000898&cpv=0>.

<sup>31</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S. Japan Alliance: Building 50 Years of Partnership* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), 2, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdts/joint1106\\_01.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdts/joint1106_01.pdf).

<sup>32</sup> Ditto, 10.

normal in the Asia Pacific for the advancement of their respective national interests. The U.S. aspires to maintain superpower status worldwide and a U.S. dominated order in the Asia Pacific.<sup>34</sup> Alternatively, Japan is trying to balance the U.S.-Japan alliance and its interests in Asia. Moreover, Japan has clearly emphasized playing “a pivotal role in constructing an open, multilayered network.”<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, China, while striving to become a fully developed nation, is emphasizing “a multipolar order in the Asia Pacific” .<sup>36</sup> China too, while engaging both the U.S. and Japan, is carving out spheres in the region excluding the U.S. and working towards ‘a status commensurate to a great power.’<sup>37</sup>

### Economic Challenges

While political shifts are contributing to the reframing of the new political normal among the U.S., Japan and China, they will also impact on reframing the economic normal as well for the three nations. Although

---

<sup>33</sup> Stephanie A. Weston, “American Smart Power in the New Era of U.S., Japan and China Relations,” in *Fukuoka Daigaku Hougaku Ronsou*, 55, No. 2 Fukuoka: Central Research Institute (2010), 215-216.

<sup>34</sup> Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *How China's Leaders Think* (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 2010), 27.

<sup>35</sup> *People's Daily Online (English)*, “Japan, China, U.S. should enhance cooperation: Japan’s FM,” December 15, 2001, <http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7676966.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Ming Wan, “The Great Recession and China’s Policy toward Asian Regionalism,” *Asian Survey*, no. 3 (2010): 529.

<sup>37</sup> Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn, International Politics in Northeast Asia: *The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle* (Carlisle, VA.: Strategic Studies Institute) (1996), 9, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=96>.



there is no formal G-3, the three economies' interdependence is growing. Moreover, I M F has predicted that China by 2016 will be the number one economy in PPP (purchase power parity) but not in GDP terms. 'The U.S., presently 130% bigger than China, will still be 70% larger by the same year.'<sup>38</sup>

Since 9/11, the U.S., which presently remains the dominant world economy, has faced ongoing economic challenges. Moreover, as the U.S. stepped up its war on terrorism, the cost of funding two wars in the Middle East, under the administrations of G.W. Bush and Obama also increased. At the same time, the Bush administration instituted tax cuts and pushed deregulation in the economic sector. The lack of tighter regulations on Wall Street and in the housing industry led to the subprime mortgage crisis as well as the Lehman Brothers Shock. This shock then triggered a global economic crisis. In the midst of the 2008 Presidential campaign, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act which authorized bailouts of \$787 billion to assist banks and other security related institutions. The U.S. government ended up giving other bailouts as well to rescue top U.S. automakers. This economic crisis at the end of G.W. Bush's second term helped to usher in the Obama administration.

After the Obama administration inherited a U.S. economy in trouble,

---

<sup>38</sup> Mark Weisbrot, "2016: when China overtakes the U.S.," [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ciframerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016), April 27, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ciframerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016>.

it has struggled to restore U.S. economic growth. And from 2010, the Obama administration has continued to confront a recalcitrant Republican majority in the House of Representatives. Frictions between the President and Congress led to an impasse over raising the U.S. debt ceiling and then finally to a watered down debt ceiling bill in Congress. The deadlock over bills in Congress along with the general state of U.S. economic affairs contributed to the lowering of the U.S.' top tier credit ranking from AAA to AA+by Standard & Poor.<sup>39</sup> Although since 2009 the Obama administration has achieved some progress on denting the high unemployment, the rate of U.S. unemployment still stands at 8.2%<sup>40</sup> versus 9.1% since August 2011.<sup>41</sup>

The Obama administration's efforts to foster U.S. economic growth include the largest stimulus package in the U.S.; additional stimulus packages; extra bailouts to the auto industry; the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; promotion of a "Green New Deal" as well as the creation of a new trade enforcement group to stop unfair trade practices.

---

<sup>39</sup> The U.S. has led the AAA credit ranking from S&P since 1941. *Reuters*, "U.S. loses prized AAA credit rating from S&P," August 6, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/061us-usa-debt-downgrade-idUSTRE7746VF20110806>

<sup>40</sup> From 1948 until 2012, the U.S.' unemployment rate averaged 5.70, reaching an all time high of 10.8000 % in November of 1982 and a record low of 2.50000 % in May of 1953. *Trading Economics*, 2012. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate>.

<sup>41</sup> Roger Ranningen and John McCormick, "Job Data Breaks Pattern that Was Boosting Obama Reelection," *Bloomberg*, August 6, 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-06/obama-may-get-election-boost-as-economists-see-more-jobs-added.html>.

Along with domestic economic legislation/initiatives, the Obama administration has pushed actively for new markets in emerging economies; concluded EPAs or FTAs with Australia, Singapore, Korea and Chile in the Asia Pacific; launched the National Export Initiative to double exports and is engaging in TPP negotiations. And during the 4th round of The U.S. and China’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue (May 2012) focused “on creating new opportunities for U.S. workers and firms; ensuring greater protection of intellectual property rights;” and increasing China’s domestic demand and financial sector reform.”<sup>42</sup> With Japan concurrently, the U.S. , for example, is also working via the Economic Harmonization Initiative to “harmonize bilateral approaches to trade, address the business climate as well as advance coordination on regimes of common interest.”<sup>43</sup> Finally, President Obama’s pitch for a U.S. Pacific Century also includes the strengthening of the U.S. weakened economy through expansion of the U.S.’ economic role in the Asia Pacific.

Looking at economic shifts, Japan economy is also troubled. Although Japan was the world’s banker in the 80s, it now has the largest public debt

---

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Department of the Treasury, *U.S. Fact Sheet-Economic Track of the Fourth Meeting of the U.S. China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Treasury Press Center,1, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1568.aspx>).

<sup>43</sup> The Office of the United States Trade Representative, *The 2012 Trade Policy Agenda and 2011 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program* (Washington, D.C.: USTR, 2012), 1, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2012-0>.

and its “first trade deficit in 30 years.”<sup>44</sup> Moreover, Japan has been hit not only by the Lehman Brothers shock but also the triple disasters of 3.11 and the economic crisis in Europe. While Japan has become the third largest economy, China has become a key engine for the Japanese economy.

Post 9/11, Japanese PMs, moreover, have tried to restructure the Japanese economy via such measures as intervening in the market to sustain the high yen; restructuring government entities into private sector organizations; creating stimulus packages; fostering investment and innovation, and doubling the sales tax to 10% sales tax by 2015. Addressing economic issues through legislation has been impeded, however, by the quick turnover of prime ministers over the past six years. It is also hampered by the DPJ’s lack of governance experience as the ruling party. The uncooperativeness as well of the LDP, now the largest opposition party, has further compounded this situation.

Although the Japan yen is tied strongly to the U.S. dollar, Japan is proactively engaging key nations like India and South Korea to improve Japanese prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. Post 9/11, Japan, for example, has concluded FTAs or EPAs with various partners including ASEAN, Singapore, Peru, India, Malaysia, Australia, The Philippines and Korea. Moreover, Japan, China and South Korea are presently working on plans for a trilateral FTA. In addition, PM Noda has expressed the

---

<sup>44</sup> *New Strait Times*, “Japan posts first annual trade deficit in 30 years,” January 25, 2012, <http://www.nst.com.my/latest/japan-posts-first-annual-trade-deficit-in-more-than-30-years-1.36812>.

government's intention to enter TPP negotiations amidst political and private resistance to this policy. Significantly, while the new normal for Japan and China emphasizes a win-win economic situation for both sides, political fallout over territorial disputes, historical problems and or traditional or non-traditional security issues disrupt smooth economic relations.

Part of the new economic normal for Japan is facilitating economic recovery from its triple disasters. Subsequently, PM Kan's administration set up reconstruction guidelines. This was followed by the establishment of the Reconstruction Agency under PM Noda. The 3.11 disasters are serving as a new platform for cooperation between Japan and China as well as between Japan and the U.S. The guidelines stress, for example, 'the promotion of a free trade system, foreign investments to Japan as well acceptance of highly skilled workers.'<sup>45</sup> This emphasis is important for improved economic relations as well among the three powers.

In general, the new economic normal for both the U.S. and Japan include pro-actively pushing measures to help address both domestic and global economic imbalances. At the same time, both countries' administrations are working through domestic political frictions to create new domestic legislation to address these imbalances.

---

<sup>45</sup> Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, *Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake* (Tokyo: Reconstruction Headquarters, 2011), 30-31, <http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/pdf/Basic%20Guidelines%20for%20Reconstruction.pdf>.

China's rising economic power is also the basis for its growing voice regionally and globally. Post 9/11, China, a key player in the G-20, has a present annual growth rate of 8.10% compared to 2% for the U.S. and 2.7% for Japan.<sup>46</sup> Although China's economic influence is spreading globally including increased investments in the U.S., Japan and the EU, its own market still has many tariff and non-tariff barriers. And China is running large surpluses with both the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. deficit with China in 2011, for example, was \$295 billion<sup>47</sup> versus 62.6 million with Japan.<sup>48</sup>

At the same time, although China's economic growth continues to be high and "its public finances are strong", the Lehman Brothers crisis and the economic crisis in Europe have slowed this growth "from industrial output to bank lending to foreign trade."<sup>49</sup> "China to counter the crisis introduced a large fiscal and monetary stimulus program in late 2008;" and new stated controlled bank loans in 2009 as well as increased its purchase of U.S. dollars.<sup>50</sup> It is also working to increase domestic consumption,

---

<sup>46</sup> *Trading Economics*, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth>, 2012; <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/gdp-growth-annual>, 2012 ; <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual>, 2012.

<sup>47</sup> Kimberly Amadeo, "U.S. Trade Deficit with China," *About.com*. (2012):par. 1, <http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/us-china-trade.htm>.

<sup>48</sup> Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, *2012 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers* (Washington, D.C.: USTR, 2012), 272, [http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Japan\\_0.pdf](http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Japan_0.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> Bob David and Tom Orlik, "China Gets Surprise Slow Down," *Wall Street Journal*, May 11, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577396954063628584.html>.

versus its over dependency on exports.

China, moreover, has turned away from ‘growth at any cost towards a more balanced and sustainable economy under the concepts of a harmonious society and the scientific development concept.’<sup>51</sup> Subsequently, some key targets of China’s 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (2011-2015) are ‘economic growth at 7%; economic restructuring; innovation; clean energy and improved lifestyles for both rural and urban residents.’<sup>52</sup>

China has a vested interest in the recovery of those economies in more ways than one. Presently, China’s slowed growth is also impacting negatively on both the U.S. and Japan economies. Moreover, as social disparities in Chinese society are growing, President Hu Jintao’s heir apparent Xi Jinping will need to work effectively to maintain social stability and the longevity of the Chinese Communist leadership. China also needs to work with the global community as well to ameliorate the impact of external economic disruptions on its own market.

Although China’s economic power is sometimes viewed as a threat to

---

<sup>50</sup> Geoffrey Garrett, “G-2 in G-20: China, the U.S. & the World after the Global Financial Crisis,” *Global Policy*, 1, No. 1 (2010): par. 20, 21 and 27, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2009.0014.x/assets/j.1758-5899.2009.00014.x.pdf?v=1&t=h3igt38a&s=306e3617e05230485ef92e05c9007c690f73ebb4>.

<sup>51</sup> APCO Worldwide Inc., *China’s 12th Five Year Plan How it Actually Works and What in Store for the next 5 years* (Beijing: APCO Worldwide Inc., 2010), 2, [http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas\\_12th\\_five-year\\_plan.pdf](http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas_12th_five-year_plan.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> *Welcome to EnglishNews.cn*, “Key Targets of China’s 12th Five Year Plan,” March 5, 2011, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c\\_13762230.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm).

both the U.S. and Japan, it has become one of the engines for the other two economies. It is also the source of China's growing soft and military powers in the region. Given this new economic normal, it is harder for the U.S. and Japan to pressure China to be a responsible stakeholder in the global community. One example of shifting positions among the three powers was evidenced by the frictions between the U.S. and China, the two top emitters of greenhouse gases, at the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009. Another was China's stopping temporarily the export of rare earth metals to Japan after a fallout between the two powers over a Chinese fishing boat incident close to the Senkaku islands in 2010. Yet another is the implementation of a direct trading system as of June 1, 2012 between the yen and the renminbi without the U.S. dollar as an intermediary for bilateral trade and investment.

Recapping the overall new economic normal in the Asia Pacific Region, there is no formal or defacto G-3 among the U.S., Japan and China for an economic global partnership. However, the "positive, cooperative and comprehensive" U.S.-China partnership; the China-Japan "mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests" as well as the U.S.-Japan alliance/global partnership all emphasize "win-win" situations. Namely, they are pro-actively doing this through the expansion of markets; new trade agreements; bilateral-multilateral institutional frameworks to resolve trade disputes and creating new opportunities for sustainable economic growth to protect their respective economic interests.

### **Security Shifts**

Besides political and economic changes to the trilateral relations among



the U.S. Japan and China, the new normal in the security area among the three powers is also manifesting important shifts. Specifically, these include increased regional involvement, transformation of military forces and stronger protection of the global commons.

### **Increased Regional Involvement**

Each power is increasing its engagement with the Asia Pacific region for the protection of respective national interests through strengthened and increasing partnerships as well as bilateral, minilateral and multilateral dialogues including traditional and or non-traditional security matters.

Since the beginning of his presidency, the Obama administration has emphasized the Asia Pacific region. However, after U.S involvement in long term Middle East conflicts, the administration is especially stressing the U.S. Pacific Century or a U.S. return to the region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, has stated “strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.”<sup>53</sup> Along with these priorities, the U.S. has increased its involvement with ASEAN, for example, by signing the Amity Treaty, joining the East Asia

---

<sup>53</sup> Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, 2011: par. 1, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11americas_pacific_century).

Summit, designating an Ambassador to ASEAN as well as adopting the Plan of Action to implement the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity 2011-2015.

The U.S., in addition, has also set up trilaterals with Australia and Japan as well as most recently U.S., Japan and India. It has further strengthened its trilateral relationship with its two N.E. allies-Japan and S. Korea. Moreover, the U.S. has deepened its security partnerships with Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. The U.S. and China under their S & ED Dialogue, initiated the new Strategic Dialogue<sup>54</sup> as well as the U.S.-China Asia Pacific Consultations in 2011<sup>55</sup>.

Japan has continued to build on bilateral agreements as well as domestic security related legislation to realign the alliance based on common strategic goals regionally and globally. And the U.S. and Japan are working to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Okinawa<sup>56</sup> while preserving the

---

<sup>54</sup> “The Strategic Security Dialogue,” established in May of 2011, “is a new channel for civilian and military leaders to discuss sensitive topics including cyber and maritime security.” Joseph Biden, *Remarks by Vice President Joseph Biden on U.S.-China Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Vice President, 2011), 3, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/08/20110821131809su0.2135279.html>.

<sup>55</sup> ‘The inaugural U.S.-China Pacific Consultations are an outcome of the 3d U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue convened in May of 2011. The goal is to obtain a better understanding of each other intentions, policies and actions towards the Asia Pacific region. It is also to enhance bilateral cooperation and promote regional security.’ U.S. Department of State, *Press Availability Following the Inaugural U.S.-China Asia Pacific Consultations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 2011), 1, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/06/16/167097.htm>.

U.S.' forward presence in the Asia Pacific.

Japan has also expanded its Japanese Self Defense Forces logistical support to handle a broad range of contingencies through various legislation. Specifically, these include the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Act (2001), the Iraq Reconstruction Act (2003) and the Armed Attack Situation Response Law (2003). Moreover, in line with its proactive global role, Japan's peacekeeping and or peace building activities post 9/11 include activities in East Timor, Indonesia, Haiti and Sudan. In addition, 'Japan has become more actively engaged in joint military exercises and training; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations in Southeast Asia.'<sup>57</sup>

Along with its alliance/global partnership with the U.S., Japan is also meeting the 'inevitable rise of China' by engaging with other 'like-minded nations' for example India and Australia.<sup>58</sup> In addition, Japan and Australia signed an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement in 2010. Moreover, Japan along with South Korea and China is actively involved in the

---

<sup>56</sup> One aspect of reducing this footprint is connected the relocation of the Futenma Air Base. Just before PM Noda's visit to the U.S. in April of 2012, the U.S. and Japan agreed to delink the issues of the Futenma Air Base relocation and the transfer of its marines. 'The transfer, however,' of the marines is contingent on the appropriate facilities being available to receive them, also joint use of certain facilities offshore as well as reduced financial support for the transfer to Guam.' Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, "U.S.-Japan Relations: Back to Normal," *Comparative Connections* (2012): par 11, [http://csis.org/files/publication/1201qus\\_japan.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/1201qus_japan.pdf).

<sup>57</sup> Ken Jimbo, "Japan should build ASEAN's Security Capacity," *AJISS Commentary* (2012):par. 4, [http://www.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/201205/30-1.html](http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201205/30-1.html).

ASEAN+3. The three countries discuss a broad common agenda including traditional and non-traditional security issues. Japan too along with the U.S. and India held their first trilateral meeting in April 2012 with the purpose of strengthening strategic relations. And Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gamba proposed during the U.S., Japan and India Trilateral that the Japan, China and the U.S. also create a trilateral. PM Noda during his visit to the Washington D.C. again touched on this theme.

Turning to China and security shifts, China's new security concept developed under the Hu Jintao administration, emphasizes "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination."<sup>59</sup> Also key to this concept is China's cooperation with other nations to 'foster an international security environment of peace, stability, equality, mutual trust and win-win.'

<sup>60</sup> These kinds of partnerships as well as other mechanisms will hopefully act as platforms for true cooperation, making it harder for these actors to engage in conflict. China has already developed various kinds of key associations in the region such as China-Thailand's-Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;

---

<sup>58</sup> The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, *Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace Creating Nation* (Tokyo: The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, 2010) 18, [http://www.kantei.go.jp/ip/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo\\_e.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/ip/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "National Defense Policy," in *China's National Defense in 2010* (2011), 1, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm).

<sup>60</sup> Ditto.

the ASEAN+China Strategic Partnership and the ASEAN+3. These frameworks are platforms to discuss bilaterally or multilaterally common and cooperative security issues and avoid conflict. Moreover, China and Russia have signed a statement in 2010 to further deepen their strategic partnership and cooperation.<sup>61</sup>

Beyond the development of partnerships, China's military diplomacy in the Asia Pacific adds to Chinese growing overall engagement in the Asia Pacific. It also adds to China's soft power generated by its economic power and reinforces China's new security concept. China's military diplomacy, for example, includes joint military exercises, port visits, exchanges of high level military officials and humanitarian assistance.

In line with its military diplomacy, China and the U.S. have established military exchanges including Defense Consultative Talks (DCT)<sup>62</sup>, Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT)<sup>63</sup> and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA).<sup>64</sup> The PLA Navy has also participated in joint exercises in which the U.S. was involved.<sup>65</sup> Concerning U.S. -

---

<sup>61</sup> Stephanie Ho, "China, Russia Agree to Strengthen Strategic Partnership" (Washington, D.C.: VOA, 2010), 1, <http://www.voanews.com/content/china-russia-agree-to-strengthen-strategic-partnership-103851564/126754.html>.

<sup>62</sup> U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks were established in 1997. The 12th meeting was held on 12/7/12. Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, "U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks on December 7," *CSIS Publications* (2011): par. 1, <http://csis.org/publication/us-china-defense-consultative-talks-december-7>.

<sup>63</sup> After the U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan in 2010, these talks were restarted this year after a long hiatus.

China defense exchanges in general, however, one analyst points out the differences between both countries regarding these exchanges- “the PLA leadership regards the military relationship with the U.S. as a political undertaking for strategic reasons not a freestanding set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons.”<sup>66</sup> Another Chinese analyst also mentioned three problems with U.S. - China military exchanges- ‘U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Congressional restrictions on military exchanges between the two countries as well as U.S. air and sea military surveillance operations in China’s exclusive EEZ.’<sup>67</sup> In spite of these issues, U.S. - Sino military exchanges are also important to ameliorate misperceptions regarding both sides’ increased involvement in the Asia Pacific.

Although defense exchanges between Japan and China date back to the

---

<sup>64</sup> “The Sino-U.S. Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, established in 1998, is basically a consultative process. “The purpose is to promote common understanding regarding activities undertaken by U.S. and China respective maritime and air forces when operating in accordance with international law.” Peter J. Brown, “U.S. & China can’t calm South China Sea,” *Asia Times* (online), June 4, 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LF04Adol.html>.

<sup>65</sup> “China-Hu Jintao Sets a Fresh Course Amidst Diverse Challenges,” in *East Asian Strategic Review* (Tokyo: EASR, 2008), 94, [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian\\_e2008\\_03.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian_e2008_03.pdf).

<sup>66</sup> Shirley A. Kan, *U.S. China Military Contact: Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2009), 16, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> David Lai, *The United States and China in Power Transition* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 197-198, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB1093.pdf>.

70<sup>s</sup>, the two countries only instituted a formal security dialogue mechanism since 1993.<sup>68</sup> And even though high level military exchanges are presently conducted on different levels, the exchanges are characterized by 'lack of substantive development and trust.'<sup>69</sup> One Chinese scholar states, 'Japan and China's defense exchanges are still at the confidence building stage. ...China and Japan have yet to carry out joint military exercises or technological defense cooperation.'<sup>70</sup> Ongoing territorial disputes, historical tensions and different motives behind these exchanges also impede deeper security relations.

With respect to U.S., Japan and China trilateral security relations, there is no formalized defense exchange framework among the three nations. At the same time, PM Noda during his official visit to the U.S. in April reiterated Japan's desire for a strategic trilateral among the three powers. Meanwhile, the U.S., Japan and China's increased regional involvement including military diplomacy and participation in mini-lateral and multilateral frameworks influence the three powers' trilateral relations. The U.S.' so called return to the Asia Pacific includes efforts to 'assure that China rise contributes to rather than detracts from Asian stability.'<sup>71</sup> Japan too has a vested interest in increased regional involvement as an

---

<sup>68</sup> Oyoi, "Chuunichi Anzen Houshou to Gunji Kouryou no Hyooka," in *Nichuu Anzen Hoshou Bouei Kouryuu Rekishi Genjou-Tenbou*, ed. Masahiro Akiyama and Shuhoo (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2011), 267.

<sup>69</sup> Ditto.

<sup>70</sup> Ditto.

ally of the U.S. And at the same time, it is a way for Japan to maintain its balance between the U.S. and China. Concurrently, China's military exchanges with the U.S. and Japan are also linked to China's "core interests." In line with these interests, China, is aiming for a multipolar order in the region, while becoming 'a fully developed nation'. Concerning overall increased regional engagement by the three powers, it is important this engagement by all three countries be viewed positively not as means to create a new order detrimental to one party or the other.

### Transformation of Military Forces

The U.S. military still maintains its worldwide superiority. And in terms of military expenditures, the U.S. ranks number one, China is number two and Japan number 6.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, given the changing security dynamics in the region, the U.S. and Chinese military forces as well as Japan's Self Defense forces are increasingly emphasizing the C4ISR<sup>73</sup> aspects of their forces; the efficient and flexible operation of their forces; the handling of

---

<sup>71</sup> Stephen Kaufman, *President Obama's Trip Underscores Asia's Importance* (Seoul, Korea: Embassy of the United States, 2010), 1, [http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p\\_rok\\_102910.html](http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_rok_102910.html).

<sup>72</sup> "The 10 countries with the highest military expenditures in 2011 are the U.S. (\$711 billion); China [\$143 billion, using market exchange rates (MER)]; Russia (\$71.9, using MER); United Kingdom (\$62.7 billion); France (\$62.5); Japan (\$59.3); India (\$48.9); Saudia Arabia (\$48.5, also includes expenditures on internal security); Germany [\$46.7 billion, using MER] and Brazil (\$35.4)." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data, 2011* (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2011), 5, [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-expenditure-2011/at\\_download/](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-expenditure-2011/at_download/).



non-traditional security matters such as search and research, disasters and the environment. Meeting asymmetrical challenges which include terrorism, WMD and ballistic missiles and or response to anti-access<sup>74</sup>/anti-denial activities<sup>75</sup> in the global commons is also key to the enhanced capacities of all three forces.

Concerning the transformation of its forces, the U.S. is seeking to rebalance its military capabilities to meet a broad range of contingencies while incorporating technological innovation. Moreover, the enhanced interoperability of U.S. forces with of key allies in the region; selective engagement over a limited period of time and “power projection despite anti-access/area denial challenges”<sup>76</sup> are important goals. Also key to a transformed U.S. military is the idea of “integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security-including diplomacy,

---

<sup>73</sup> C4ISR=Concept of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011) 8, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011\\_cmpr\\_final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf).

<sup>74</sup> “Anti-access refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area.” U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational and Access Concept* (JOAC), (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012), i, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC\\_Jan%202012\\_Signed.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> “Area denial refers to those actions and capabilities usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.” Ditto.

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012), 4, [http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Strategic\\_Guidance.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf).

development, law enforcement, trade and intelligence-to address threats.”

<sup>77</sup> This kind of transformation is also linked to U.S. smart power foreign policy initiatives or in other words “the combining U.S. hard and soft power in an integrated strategy.” <sup>78</sup>

In December of 2010, Japan, the U.S.’ top ally in Asia, introduced its new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The new NDPO points out the need for an even more pro-active SDF not only in the Asia Pacific region but also in the global community. Moreover, great emphasis is also placed on the Self Defense Forces’ flexibility, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacities and inter-operations. The previous NDPO emphasized ‘a Basic Defense Force involved in static deterrence based on the quantities and size of weapons and troops.’ Now the new NDPO talks about “dynamic deterrence with enhanced operational capacities.” <sup>79</sup>

Japan too is increasing its “multi-layered security cooperation” in the Asia Pacific region through its alliances with the U.S. and Australia as well as cooperation with ASEAN, Korea and other key actors in the region.

Awareness of Japan’s SDF roles with respect to the changing security environment is reflected as well by the results of a recent Japanese Cabinet

---

<sup>77</sup> *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2010), xiii, [http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf).

<sup>78</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart-Combining Hard and Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, 88, no. 4 (2009): par. 2, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart>.

<sup>79</sup> Ministry of Defense (Japan), *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2010), 7, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23\\_ndpg\\_en.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf).

Office Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues.” The survey, for example, clearly shows an increase of those surveyed in Jan 2009 vs. Jan 2012 who feel that the “defense capabilities of the SDF should be increased” (14.1%) (2009) vs. 24.8% (2012).<sup>80</sup> And more people in 2012 (82.3 %) vs. 2009 (77.3 %) felt that the way to “protect the safety of Japan are the current Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the SDF.”<sup>81</sup>

Related to the transformation of its military forces, China’s aims to protect its sovereignty, regime, create forces commensurate to a great power as well as national development.<sup>82</sup> In line with these trends, China’s expenditures for military modernization is still in the double digits (approximately an increase of 11% in 2012).<sup>83</sup> Moreover, China is developing a blue navy and aims to create an indigenous aircraft carrier. In addition, China is ‘strengthening its strategic ports and airfield construction projects through the S. China sea to the Strait of Malacca, over to the Indian Ocean and along the coast of the Arabian Sea and

---

<sup>80</sup> Japanese Cabinet Office, Public Relations, *Outline of Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues* (Tokyo: Japanese Cabinet Office: 2012), 8, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/others/pdf/public\\_opinion.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/public_opinion.pdf).

<sup>81</sup> Ditto. 23.

<sup>82</sup> Dr. Jagannath P. Panda, “China’s Path to Power,” *Strategic Analysis*, 32, no. 5. (2008), 908.

<sup>83</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012), 6, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pds/2012\\_cmpr\\_final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pds/2012_cmpr_final.pdf).

Persian Gulf<sup>84</sup> and projecting its military power beyond the so-called first chain of islands.<sup>85</sup> China is also continuing to build up anti-access/anti-denial strategies through “continued investment in advance cruise missiles, short medium range conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counter space weapons and military capabilities”<sup>86</sup>; stealth aircraft, quiet submarines<sup>87</sup> as well as anti-satellite and missile defense tests. “China’s power” too “is extending across the E. Asian mainland and eroding U.S. presence in its immediate land and coastal periphery.”<sup>88</sup> These Chinese military transformations and asymmetrical strategies are an increasing concern not only to the U.S. and Japan but other actors in the region as well.

Although both Japan and the U.S. emphasize that they are not trying to contain China, it is evident that Chinese expanded military activities

---

<sup>84</sup> Vivian Yang, “Is China’s String of Pearls Real,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (2011): par. 1, [http://www.fpiif.org/articles/is\\_chinas\\_string\\_of\\_pearls\\_real](http://www.fpiif.org/articles/is_chinas_string_of_pearls_real).

<sup>85</sup> ‘The first island chain connects the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the Philippines.’ “China-Insecurity amid a Rise to Great Power Status,” in *East Asian Strategic Review* (Tokyo: EASR, 2010), 127, [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2010/east-asian\\_e.2010\\_04.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2010/east-asian_e.2010_04.pdf).

<sup>86</sup> Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress 2012 *Military and Security Development involving the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012), 2-5, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012\\_cmpr\\_final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_cmpr_final.pdf).

<sup>87</sup> Roger Cliff, *Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy* (Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand, 2011), 7, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND\\_CT354.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT354.pdf).

<sup>88</sup> Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of Chinese Power and the Implications for the Regional Security Order,” *Orbis* 54, no. 4 (2010): 544.

has contributed to the transformation of both U.S. forces and the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Of course, other traditional security threats as well as increasing non-traditional threats have also greatly influenced the transformation of all three forces.

Of the three nations in the trilateral relationship, China has the closest ties with North Korea. However, China has not effectively responded, to the satisfaction of neither the U.S. or Japan, to North Korea's aggressive actions including missile launches; the development of nuclear weapons; the invasion of South Korean waters as well as the shelling of the South Korean island of Pongp'ong. While China hesitates to condemn North Korea's aggressive actions, the latter's "brinkmanship" is an ongoing threat for the stability of the Asia Pacific region. Not only North Korea but also Taiwan is a key security issue for all three powers. And China's military transformation is also connected to preventing any breakaway by Taiwan. At the same time, de facto economic integration brings Taiwan and China closer. In addition, Taiwan, under the renewed leadership of Ma ying-jeou, continues to foster positive cross strait relations, ameliorating possible conflict. At the same time, as Taiwan remains a part of China's core interests, the potential for conflict still remains. And China is building up its capacity to attack Taiwan if needed. Friction between the U.S. and China over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or Chinese opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) statement in 2005 regarding Taiwan as a common security concern are reminders of this issue's importance for the protection of Chinese sovereignty.

### Protection of the Global Commons

The global commons can be defined as “domains or areas that no one state controls but on which all rely.”<sup>89</sup> Moreover, “global security and prosperity are contingent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea, as well as information transmitted under the ocean or through space.”<sup>90</sup>

The protection of the global commons has become an increasingly important security issue for all three powers related to maintaining open navigation and access to sea lanes. Of course, this protection is directly linked as well to their overall respective national interests. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, states “it will explore opportunities for a more forward deployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and enhanced capabilities for assured access to the sea, air, space and cyberspace.”<sup>91</sup> In *China’s National Defense in 2010*, it states “China’s national defense is tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights and interests and maintain its security interests in space, electro magnetic space and cyber space.”<sup>92</sup> In *Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011*

---

<sup>89</sup> U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2010),8, [http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf).

<sup>90</sup> Ditto.

<sup>91</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2010),66, [http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf).

<sup>92</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “National Defense Policy,” in *China’s National Defense in 2010*, (Peking, China: State Council, 2011),1, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm).

*and Beyond*, it mentions that “Japan play an active role in international activities to maintain and strengthen international public goods including the stable use of the maritime domain, outer space and cyberspace.”<sup>93</sup>

While China modernizes and builds up its presence regionally, the U.S. is responding to these trends not only by its so called return to the Asia Pacific but also through the development of its own anti access/denial strategies. These include development of an “overarching operational access concept.” Namely, “joint (U.S.) force contribution to assured access, the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace.”<sup>94</sup> Also a potential part of such a conceptual framework is the “Air Sea Battle Concept.” Specifically, this concept emphasizes “long range strike capabilities, exploiting advantages in sub-surface operation, increasing the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure and assuring access to space and the use of space assets.”<sup>95</sup> Moreover, the U.S. has established a U.S. Cyber Command; is expanding its strategic presence around the Asia Pacific as well as incorporating these concerns on multilateral agendas to contribute to the protection of the global commons.

---

<sup>93</sup> Ministry of Defense (Japan), *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond* (Tokyo, Japan, 2010), 9, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23\\_ndpg\\_en.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf).

<sup>94</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational and Access Concept* (JOAC), (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012), 4, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC\\_Jan90202012\\_Signed.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan90202012_Signed.pdf).

<sup>95</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2010), 32, [http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.govqdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf).

Japan, an island nation with limited resources, has a vested interest in the protection of strategic access to the global commons. Japan's strong concern regarding the protection of the global commons was reflected clearly in a statement made by Prime Minister Naoto Kan- "We are concerned about its (China) strengthening defense capabilities without transparency and accelerating maritime activities spanning the Indian Ocean to the East China Sea." <sup>96</sup>

In line with the above thinking, Japan, while transforming its Self Defense Forces into a more dynamic deterrent, has been proactive in the area of maritime security including a plan to increase its submarines to 22 from 16<sup>97</sup>; enhancing joint ballistic missile defense with the U.S.; creating a joint and a Global Supply Chain Initiative (2012)<sup>98</sup>; as well as 'contributing to ASEAN countries' maritime capacity building.'<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japanese PM Naoto Kan warns of China military rise," *BBCNews Asia Pacific*, October 1, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11450791>.

<sup>97</sup> Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japan wary of rise in China's maritime Activities," *Reuter*, August 2, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-japan-military-china-idUSTRE7711D020110802>.

<sup>98</sup> U.S. and Japan during PM Noda's visit to the U.S. in April of 2012 issued a *Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain Security*. While the U.S. & Japan "have outlived ways to cooperate more closely to strengthen the security and resiliency of its global supply chain and promote the timely efficient flow of legitimate commerce." Included in those efforts, if possible, is "the coordination of capacity building in the Asia Pacific to strengthen regional border port, maritime and aviation security." Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: United States-Japan Cooperative Initiatives* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012), 1, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/30/fact-sheet-united-states-japan-cooperative-initiatives>.



Post 9/11, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is playing a key role in protecting the global commons and strengthening Japan's global image as well as contributing to international security. For example, Japan is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)<sup>100</sup> created under the George W. Bush administration. And both the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard are involved in interdiction efforts regarding WMD. Moreover, to further support its anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, Japan established its first SDF base overseas in Djibouti. "India, China and Japan have also agreed for better coordination amongst their naval ships deployed for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden."<sup>101</sup> These trends significantly reflect Japan's growing role as related to the protection of the global commons.

The political as well as economic fallout respectively from clashes in the global commons between the U.S. and China as well as China and Japan has increased post 9/11. For example, China has carried out incursions into the Japanese EEZ by either military or commercial interests and cyber

---

<sup>99</sup> Ken Jimbo, "Japan Should Build ASEAN's Security Capacity," *AJISS Commentary* (2012):par. 7, [http://www.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/201205/30-1.html](http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201205/30-1.html).

<sup>100</sup> The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), started on 5/31/03, "is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern." U.S. Department of State, *Proliferation Security Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State), <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> *newKerala.com*, "Indo-China-Japan Agree on Maritime Cooperation," March 14, 2012, <http://newkerala.com/news/2011/worldnews-172586.html#.T8neUqNhiSM>.

attacks on Japan and the U.S.. China has also denied a U.S. ship a port call to Hong Kong. China is also following its own rules concerning what determines the global commons as well as harassing U.S. surveillance ships.

This kind of Chinese pro-activity in the global commons is seen as a threat by the U.S. and Japan as well as other actors in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, 'different interpretations of the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); different delineation of the EEZ and differing rules regarding access related to different kinds of maritime situations'<sup>102</sup>, added to varying historical claims, nationalism, the search for new energy and other resources as well as the protection of territorial integrity, also make it easier to politicize these tensions among the three powers.<sup>103</sup>

Meanwhile, China continues to emphasize its peaceful rise. And through CBMs, such as, military diplomacy, defense exchanges, signing of the Treaty of Amity as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (2002), China seeks to allay anxieties over its military's expanded activities in the region related to the global commons.

The pro-activity of key actors including the U.S. and Japan, at the same time, concerning the global commons in the Asia Pacific, however, also runs the risk of a negative interpretation by China; namely, the containment of China. China in its *National Defense in 2010* states "Suspicion about China, interference and countering moves against China from the

---

<sup>102</sup> Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity-China-Japan Security Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 2010, 68-70.

<sup>103</sup> Ditto.

outside are on the increase.”<sup>104</sup> For the protection of national interests in the global commons, the three powers increasingly need to create platforms for cooperation to avoid future conflicts.

Reframing of the new normal in the U.S.-China-Japan security relations has become increasingly key to the new security order in the Asia Pacific. The reframing by the three nations is clearly seen by their increased regional involvement; the setting of cooperative strategic goals; the transformation of military forces in terms of strategy, logistics and technology as well as expanded measures to protect the global commons.

### Conclusions

Although it is clear that the U.S. is still in the pivot position in the triangle, China's rise is a challenge to both the U.S. and Japan. At the same time, it is also a window to reframe the new normal among the three powers in the Asia Pacific to protect their respective national interests. While doing so, they are also creating new platforms for cooperation to avoid conflict.

Moreover, due to respective political, economic and security needs, there is a growing interdependence among the three powers which can help to temper aggressive actions towards against each other. However, this is not a full proof brake against potential conflict. As discussed earlier in

---

<sup>104</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "Security Situation," in *China's National Defense in 2010* (Peking, China: State Council, 2011), 1, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm).

this paper, political disruptions as well as aggressive actions in the global commons have caused breaks in smooth bilateral relationships among the three powers. Moreover, in the case of Japan and China, nationalism may dictate stronger responses regarding points of friction. In China, as well, policy decisions are strongly linked to regime survival. In the U.S. and Japan, political impasses concerning policymaking make it difficult sometimes to create forward looking policies based on national consensus. Thus, it is important that the leadership in all three countries continue to work through existing mechanisms while creating new platforms for cooperation to ameliorate the rising avenues for conflict. Furthermore, it is essential for the three countries to keep their communication channels open to avoid friction, misperceptions and collateral damage to other areas of respective national interest.

Since 9/11, the number of trilaterals in the region has expanded. However, there is no real rush for China to form such a trilateral with the U.S. and Japan. This is not only because of upcoming political shifts in China but also because China is creating its own sphere of influence separate from the U.S. Moreover, China is already the host of six party talks which involve the U.S., Japan, Russia and South Korea over one of the key traditional security issues in the region. In addition, as China has already stepped away from a formal G2 framework with the U.S., joining an institutionalized trilateral with the U.S. and Japan is not necessarily an easier proposition.

Although the U.S. and Japan accept that the rise of China is inevitable, they are pro-actively reframing the new economic normal in and outside of the trilateral relations in the Asia Pacific. Specific measures include the

restructuring of their respective economies to overcome global financial crisis and natural disasters; meeting the challenges of globalization; changing the patterns of consumption and creating new demand for exports. And all three powers are also pro-actively focused on the Asia Pacific region as a key to their national as well as regional prosperity.

Reframing the new economic normal which includes weakened U.S. and Japan economies versus relatively higher economic growth in China is linked to maximizing bilateral and multilateral changes to foster “win-win” economic situations in and outside of the triangle in the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, security issues are significantly increasing related to the reframing of U.S.-Japan-China relations in the Asia Pacific. This is evidenced by deepening regional involvement; transformation of their military or defense capacities as well as increased efforts to protect the global commons. Common threads running through all of these areas are 1) a closer U.S.-Japan alliance with reaffirmation and expansion of common strategies and goals; 2) increased regional involvement by all three powers to embrace different kinds of partnerships, agreements and joint exercises to cover a broad range of contingencies—traditional and non-traditional security challenges; 3) transformation of all three powers’ military or defense capacities; 4) threat of potential regional conflicts and 5) political disputes related to respective core interests easily upsetting bilateral relations within the triangle.

Thus, the reframing of the new normal in U.S.-Japan-China relations in the Asia Pacific to protect respective national interests while creating new platforms for cooperation to avoid conflict is a work in progress. All three powers are proactively executing policies and reformulating their

regional visions to protect their national interests while strengthening their respective spheres of influence. All three powers are committed officially to win-win relationships, however, national interest, political restraints and regime survival needs can distort perceptions of what is “win-win” and or what can be common interests to realize such relationships. It is up to the respective leaders to continue to slice through official rhetoric and link respective core interests to improved trilateral relations. And as the dynamics in the Asia Pacific region which impact on this defacto trilateral relationship are evolving quickly, it will be time to re-examine once again the significance of this reframing after political leadership changes in both China and Japan and after the U.S. either enters the second term of an Obama administration or the first term of his successor.

### Bibliography

Amadeo, Kimberly. “U.S. Trade Deficit with China.” *About.com*, 2012. <http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/us-china-trade.htm>.

APCO Worldwide Inc. *China 12<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan*. Beijing: APCO Worldwide Inc., 2010. [http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas\\_12th\\_five-year\\_plan.pdf](http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas_12th_five-year_plan.pdf).

Biden, Joseph. *Remarks by Vice President Joseph Biden on U.S.-China Relations*. Washington, DC: Office of Vice President, 2011. <http://iipditigal.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/08/20110821131809su0.2135279.html>.

Brown, Peter J. “U.S and China can’ t calm South China Sea.” *Asia Times (Online)*, 2010.<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LF04Adol.html>.

Bush, Richard C. *The Perils of Proximity-China-Japan Security Relations*.

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Bush, Richard C. "The United States and China: A G-2 in the Making?" Brookings.edu. [http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/1011\\_china\\_us\\_g2\\_bush.aspx?p=1](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/1011_china_us_g2_bush.aspx?p=1)

"China-Hu Jintao Sets a Fresh Course Amidst Diverse Challenges." In *East Asian Strategic Review*. Tokyo: EASR, 2008. [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian\\_e2008\\_03.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2008/east-asian_e2008_03.pdf).

"China-Insecurity amid a Rise to Great Power Status." In *East Asian Strategic Review*. Tokyo: EASR, 2010. [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2010/east-asian\\_e.2010\\_04.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2010/east-asian_e.2010_04.pdf).

China.org.cn. *Hu's Report at 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress-Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All*. Peking: China.org.cn, 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm#3>.

Cliff, Roger. *Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2011. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND\\_CT354.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT354.pdf).

Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific Century." *Foreign Policy* (2011) . [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11americas_pacific_century).

Clinton, Hillary Rodham. *Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century-Remarks*. Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Dept. of State, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/154653.htm>.

Clinton, Hillary Rodham. *Joint Press Availability with U.S. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara*. Washington, D.C.: The Dept. of State, 2010. <http://>

[www.state.gov.secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm](http://www.state.gov.secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm).

Christoffersen, Gaye. "Japan and the East Asian Maritime Security Order: Prospects for Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation." *Asian Perspective* 33, no. 3 (2009): 107-149.

David, Bob and Orlik Tom. "China gets Surprise Slow Down." *Wall Street Journal*. May 11, 2012. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577396954063628584.html>.

Dotson, John. *The China Rising Leaders Project Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Emerging Next Generation Leaders*. Washington D.C.: USCC, 2012. [http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC\\_staff\\_Report\\_Rising\\_Leadershipinthe\\_CCP\\_\(March%202012\).pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC_staff_Report_Rising_Leadershipinthe_CCP_(March%202012).pdf).

Easley, Leif Eric. "Envisioning U.S.-Japan-China Cooperation Strategic Coordination with High Standards for State Behavior." *Issues and Insights*, 8, No.11 (2008). [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights\\_v08n11.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n11.pdf).

Easley, Leif Eric, "Envisioning U.S.-Japan-China Cooperation." *Issues and Insights* 7, No. 6 (2007). [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights\\_v07n06.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v07n06.pdf).

Emektsioglou, Eleni. "U.S. Military's A2/AD Challenge." *The Diplomat* (2012). <http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2012/01/18/u-s-militarys-a2nd-challenge/>

English.news.cn. "Key Targets of China's 12<sup>th</sup> five year plan." March 3, 2011. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c\\_13762230.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm).

Englishpeople.com.cn. "Bush's Visit to China Reaffirms Constructive Ties: U.S. Official." February 28, 2012. <http://englishpeople.com>.



cn/200202/28/eng20020228\_911416.shtml.

Feffer, John. "Asia: Japan and South Korea Strengthen Maritime Ties with U.S." *Global Information Network* (2008).

Fassler, Kim. "Trilateral Collaboration in 3 Dimensions." *Issues & Insights*, 10, no. 5 (2010). [http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights\\_v10n05.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v10n05.pdf).

Flanagan, Ed. "NBC space expert on North Korea Satellite launch: It's not a Military Missile..but it's darn close'." *msnbc.com*, April 2012. [http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/\\_news/2012/04/09/11101174-nbc-space-expert-on-north-korea-satellite-launch-its-not-a-military-missile-but-its-darn-close?lite](http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/04/09/11101174-nbc-space-expert-on-north-korea-satellite-launch-its-not-a-military-missile-but-its-darn-close?lite).

Garrett, Geoffrey. "G-2 in G-20: China, the U.S. & the World after the Global Financial Crisis." *Global Policy*, 1, No. 1 (2010) <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2009.0014.x/assets/j.1758-5899.2009.0014.x.pdf?v=1&t=h3igt38a&s=306e306e3617e05230485ef92e05c9007c690f73ebb4>.

Glaser, Bonnie and Billingsley, Brittany. "U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks on December 7." *CSIS Publications* (2011). <http://csis.org/publication/us-china-defense-consultative-talks-december-7>.

Green, Michael J. and Koizumi, Shinjiro. "U.S.-Japan Relations: Abe Shows the Right Stuff." *Comparative Connections* (2012). [http://www.org/files/publication/1201qus\\_japan.pdf](http://www.org/files/publication/1201qus_japan.pdf).

Green, Michael J. and Szechenyi, Nicholas. "U.S.-Japan Relations: Back to Normal." *Comparative Connections* (2012). [http://csis.org/files/publication/1201qus\\_japan.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/1201qus_japan.pdf).

Glosserman, Brad, ed. "From Triangle to Trilateral: The Next Generation view U.S.-China-Japan Relations." *Issues and Insights*, 6, No. 8 (2006). <http://>

csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issues/insights\_v06n08.pdf.

Guofei, Chu, et.al. “How Able Are We? *Issues & Insights* 8, No.11 (2008): 9-14. [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights\\_v08n11.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n11.pdf).

Hannesson, Kristofer. *The U.S.-Japan-China Triangle: Shifting Power Balances in East Asia and the World*. Iceland: University of Iceland, 2009.

Ho, Stephanie. “China, Russia Agree to Strengthen Strategic Partnership.” Washington, D.C.: VOA, 2010. <http://www.voanews.com/content/china-russia-agree-to-strengthen-strategic-partnership-103851564/126754.html>.

Hook, Glenn D, Gilson, Julie Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. *Japan's International Relations, 159-253*. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Indyk, Martin S., et al. “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy-A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History.” *Foreign Affairs* May/June (2012): 29-43.

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “National Defense Policy.” In *China's National Defense in 2010*. Peking: State Council, 2011. [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm).

Interview with Masafumi Iida, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Students on 10/14/11, Tokyo, Japan.

Interview with Masayuki Masuda, Analyst, National Institute for Defense Studies on 10/14/11, Tokyo, Japan.

Interview with Professor Seiichiro Takagi on 11/13/11, Tsukuba, Japan.

Interviews with Ret. Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda, Maritime Self Defense Force on 10/17 and 11/14, 2011, Tokyo, Japan.

Interview with Ret. Lt. Gen. Toshiyuki Shikata. on 10/17/11, Tokyo, Japan.

Japanese Cabinet Office Public Relations. *Outline of Public Opinion Survey*

*on the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues*. Tokyo: Japanese Cabinet Office, 2012. [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/others/pdf/public\\_opinion.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/public_opinion.pdf).

Jimbo, Ken. "Japan should build ASEAN's Security Capacity." AJISS Commentary, 2012. [http://www.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/201205/30-1.html](http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201205/30-1.html).

Kan, Shirley A. *U.S.-China Military Contact: Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2009. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf>. 124665.pdf.

Kaufman, Stephen. "President Obama's Trip Underscores Asia's Importance."

Seoul: Embassy of the U.S., 2010. [http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p\\_rok\\_102910.html](http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_rok_102910.html).

Kim, Jack. "Seoul must change to "trustpolitik" with North, says Park." Reuters. August 23, 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/8/23/us-korea-north-park-idUSTRE77M14Y20110823>.

Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. *How China's Leaders Think*. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd., 2010.

Lai, David. *The U.S. and China in Power Transition*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1093>.

Ministry of Defense (Japan). *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond*. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense (Japan), 2010. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23\\_ndpg-en.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg-en.pdf).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Fact-Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperative Initiatives*.

Tokyo: MOFA, 2012. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact\\_Sheet\\_en.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact_Sheet_en.pdf).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “International Situation and Japanese Diplomacy in 2007.” In *Diplomatic Bluebook 2008 Summary*, Chapter I. Tokyo: MOFA, 2008. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2008/html/indexhtml>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan Efforts based on Anti Terrorism Special Measures Law. Tokyo: MOFA, 2005. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/effort0510.htm/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan-People’s Republic of China Summit Meeting Summary*. Tokyo: MOFA, 2011. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meeting1112.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Towards a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building 50 Years of Partnership*. Tokyo: MOFA, 2011. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdts/joint1106\\_01.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdts/joint1106_01.pdf).

Mulgan, Aurelia George. “Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30, no. 1 (2008): 52-72.

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. *NIDS China Security Report*. Tokyo: Japan: NIDS, 2011.

*newKerala.com*. “Indo-China-Japan agree on Maritime Cooperation.” March 14, 2012. <http://newkerala.com/news/2011/worldnews-172586.html#.T8neUqNhiSM>.

*New Strait Times*. “Japan posts first annual trade deficit in 30 years.” January 25, 2012. <http://www.nst.com.my/latest/japan-posts-first-annual-trade-deficit-in-more-than-30-years-1.36812>.

Nishihara, Masashi. “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s “Coercive”

Diplomacy leads to new Power Alignments.” *RIPS Policy Perspectives*, no. 11 (2011). [http://www.rips.or.jp/research/RIPS\\_Policy\\_Perspectives\\_11.pdf](http://www.rips.or.jp/research/RIPS_Policy_Perspectives_11.pdf).

Nuland, Victoria. *North Korean Announcement of Missile Launch*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185910.htm>.

Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power & American Foreign Policy.” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no.2 (2004). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20202345.pdf>.

Nye, Joseph S. “Get Smart-Combining Hard and Soft Power.” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4, 2009.<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart>.

Office of the Press Secretary. *Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2011. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/19/fact-sheet-east-asia-summit>.

Office of Press Secretary. *Fact Sheet: United States-Japan Cooperative Initiatives*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/30/fact-sheet-united-states-japan-cooperative-initiatives>.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012*. Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012\\_cmpr\\_final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_cmpr_final.pdf).

Office of the Spokesperson. *Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2011/06/1665997.htm>.

Office of the Spokesperson. *Security Consultative Committee Document*

*Progress on the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan*. Washington, D.C: U.S. Dept. of State, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166600.htm>.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. *2012 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*. Washington, D.C.: USTR, 2012. [http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Japan\\_0.pdf](http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Japan_0.pdf).

Office of the United States Trade Representative. *The 2012 Trade Policy Agenda and 2011 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program*. Washington, D.C.: USTR, 2012. <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications/2012-0>.

Oyoi. "Chuunichi Anzen Houshou to Gunji Kouryou no Hyooka." In *Nichuu Anzen Houshou Bouei Kouryuu Rekishi Genjou-Tenbou*, ed. by Masahiro Akiyama and Shuhoo, 254-291. Tokyo: Aki Shobou, 2011.

Panda, Dr. Jagannath P. "China Path to Power." *Strategic Analysis*, 32, no. 5, 2008: 901-911.

*People's Daily Online* (English). "Japan, China, U.S. should enhance cooperation: Japan's FM." December 15, 2011. <http://english.people.com.cn/9088317676966.html>.

*People's Daily Online* (English). "Japanese Ambassador's three-day trip to help improve strained bilateral ties." December 21, 2010. <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7237346.html>.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future*. Tokyo: PM of Japan and his Cabinet, 2012. [http://ww.kantei.go.jp/foregin/noda/diplomcatic/201204/30usa\\_e.html](http://ww.kantei.go.jp/foregin/noda/diplomcatic/201204/30usa_e.html).

Przystup, James J. "Japan-China Relations: All's Well that Ends Well." *Comparative Connections* 12, no. 1, 2010. <http://csis.org/files/>

publication/1001qjapan\_china.pdf.

Przystup, James J. “Japan-China Relations: Troubled Waters to Calm Seas.” *Comparative Connections*, 2010. [http://csis.org/files/publication/1002qjapan\\_china.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/1002qjapan_china.pdf).

Ranningen, Roger and McCormick, John. “Job Data Breaks Pattern that Was Boosting Obama Reelection.” *Bloomberg*. April 6, 2012. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-06/obama-may-get-election-boost-as-economists-see-more-jobs-added.html>.

Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. *Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake*. Tokyo: Reconstruction Headquarters, 2011. [http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/English/pdf/Basic % 20Guidelines % 20for % 20Reconstruction.pdf](http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/English/pdf/Basic%20Guidelines%20for%20Reconstruction.pdf).

Regional Economic Policy Support Facility, Phase II. *About the East Asia Summit*. Kuala Lumpur: REPSF. <http://www.asean.org/aadcp/repfs/abouteastiasummit.html>

Reuters. “U.S. loses prized AAA credit rating from S&P.” August 6, 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/061us-usa-debt-downgrade-idUSTRE7746VF20110806>.

Richburg, Keith B. “China military spending to top \$100 billion in 2012, alarming neighbors.” *The Washington Post*. March 4, 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldchina-military-spending-to-top-100-billion-this-year/2012/03/04/glQAJRnypr\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldchina-military-spending-to-top-100-billion-this-year/2012/03/04/glQAJRnypr_story.html).

Ross, Robert. “The Rise of Chinese Power and the Implications for the Regional Security Order.” *Orbis* 54, no. 4, 2010: 525-545.

Scobell, Andrew. “Chinese Foreign Policy and the War on Terror.”

*Terrorism Monitor*, no. 2 (2005). [http://www.jamestown.org/single?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=431](http://www.jamestown.org/single?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=431).

Skanderup, Mary Jane, Rapporteur. *Toward a Stronger Foundation for United States Japan and China Relations*. Issues and Insights, 4, No. 6 (2004). [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights\\_v04n06.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights_v04n06.pdf).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data*. Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2011. [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011/at\\_download/file](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011/at_download/file).

Sung-han, Kim. "Searching for a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism." *Asian Perspective*, 32, No. 4, 2008: 127-156.

Takenaka, Kiyoshi. "Japanese PM Naoto Kan warns of China military rise." *BBC News Asia Pacific*. October 1, 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11450791>.

Takenaka, Kiyoshi. "Japan wary of rise in China's Maritime Activities." *Reuter*. August 2, 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-japan-military-china-idUSTRE7711D020110802>.

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era. *Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace Creating Nation*. Tokyo: The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era.2010. [http://www.kantei.go.jp/ip/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo\\_e.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/ip/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf).

The Democratic Party of Japan. "Koshiishi signs memorandum regarding Party Exchanges and Cooperation with CPC." Tokyo: DPJ, 2012. <http://ww.dpj.or.jp/english/news?num=20426>.

*The Korea Herald*. "Trilateral Secretariat officially opens in



Seoul.” September 27, 2011.<http://view.koreaherald.com/k/h/view.php?ud=20110927000898&cpv=0>.

The White House. *U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future*. Washington, D.C.: The White House. <http://www.white.house.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/30/united-states-japan-joint-statement-shared-vision-future>.

*Trading Economics*. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate>. 2012.

<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth>. 2012.

<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual>. 2012.

<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual>. 2012.

Trenin, Dmitri. *True Partners? How Russia & China See Each Other*. London: Centre for European Reform. <http://www/ceer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/rp-065-4622.pdf>.

“Trilateral Collaboration in Three Dimensions: U.S.-Japan-China Cooperation Politics, Economics, and Security.” *Issues & Insights* 10, No. 5, 2010. <http://csis.org/fles/publication/issuesinsightsv10n05.pdf>.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operational and Access Concept (JOAC)*. Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012. [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC\\_Jan%202012\\_Signed.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf).

U.S. Department of Defense. *Commander Accepts Award, Reflects on Operation Tomodachi*. Washington D.C.: DOD, 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66097>.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2012. [http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Strategic\\_Guidance.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf).

U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.:DOD, 2010.[http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf).

U.S. Department of State. *Press Availability Following the Inaugural U.S.-China Asia Pacific Consultations*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/06/16/167097.htm>.

U.S. Department of State. *Proliferation Security Initiative*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. *U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 2012. <http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/china.aspx>.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. *U.S. Fact Sheet-Economic Track of the Fourth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Treasury Press Center.

Wan, Ming. "The Great Recession and China's Policy toward Asian Regionalism." *Asian Survey* (2010): 520-538.

Weisbrot Mark. "2016:when China overtakes the U.S." *guardian.co.uk*. April 27, 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016>.

*Welcome to EnglishNews.cn*. "Key Targets of China's 12th Five Year Plan." March 5, 2011. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c\\_13762230.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm).

Weston, Stephanie. "American Smart Power in the New Era of U.S., Japan and China Relations." In *Fukuoka Daigaku Hougaku Ronsou*, 55, No. 2,187-237. Fukuoka: Central Research Institute, 2010.

Wilborn, Dr. Thomas L. *International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China*

*Japan United States Strategic Triangle*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=96>.

Woo, Seongji. "Triangle Research and Understanding Northeast *Asian Politics*." *Asian Perspective*, 27, No. 2, 2003: 33-63.

www.chinaview.cn. "Backgrounder: China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue." June 17, 2008. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/7/content\\_8381724.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/7/content_8381724.htm).

Yang, Bojiang. "Japan's Enhanced Role in World Affairs and Impact on Trilateral Cooperation." *Issues and Insights*, 3, No. 9 (2003). <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights.v03n09.pdf>.

Yang, Vivian. "Is China's String of Pearls Real." *Foreign Policy in Focus* (2011). [http://www.fpi.org/articles/is\\_chinas\\_string\\_of\\_pearls\\_real](http://www.fpi.org/articles/is_chinas_string_of_pearls_real).

Yamauchi, Toshihiro. "SDF's Operation in the Indian Ocean." *Japan Institute of Constitutional Law* (2007). <http://www.jicl.jp/english/related/backnumber20080211.html>.

Zielonka, Ryan. "Amidst Trial, Ties that Bind: Enduring Strength in the U.S.-Japan Alliance." *National Bureau of Research Brief* (2011). <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121>.