

‘Blood and Mony’ and ‘Great Pains and Expence’
: The Conflicts between Massachusetts and
British Imperialists Concerning Possession and
Usage of the Eastern Frontier of Massachusetts
in the 18th Century

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In the autumn of 1730, David Dunbar, the Surveyor General of Woods for the British Government, visited Maine, the eastern frontier of Massachusetts. His purpose was to inspect whether “the White Pine Act” was being observed. This act, which prohibited cutting certain sizes of white pines in New England, besides those belonging to private properties granted before 1691, was enacted by the British Parliament to reserve white pines for the use of the British Navy. Although Dunbar intended to admonish the mill owners to observe the Act, he found himself dismayed as soon as he visited the area. For example, there were a very small number of persons in the region surrounding Casco Bay, but the lands were “generally called private property”. When Dunbar ordered the mill owners owning lands to present something to prove their title, almost all of them refused. And the patent some of them showed him with reluctance was one which the Governor of the New England Dominion, Edmund Andros, granted in 1688. When Dunbar pointed out to the owner “the reserves

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of wheat and mony” in the patent,

They then disdained those titles, and sayd they did not esteem them, for that they had some old titles, and from Sir Ferdinando Gorge and Indian deeds ; I asked why they replyed because they seemed best to the eye...¹

When the British royal officer attempted to make use of the lands and resources of the North American frontier for the British Empire, he felt something strange in the thinking of colonials about what made their legal right valid.

Many scholars of Colonial American history have recently argued that Britons living in the Atlantic world thought of the British Empire as an integrated political community which having a “Common Wealth” concerning commerce, religion, political interests². This argument has criticized the traditional writings of Colonial American history as isolated from the other world, and stresses that colonials were living in a broader world like Atlantic community or the British Empire. But some historians have pointed out problems of this argument. For example, Eliga H. Gould asserts that Atlantic History obscures the awareness of contemporary Britons about differences between Britain and colonies on society, environment, and law. Also according to Bernard Bailyn, the elites of colonial America, who frequently visited Britain and Europe, knew very well

¹ Cecil Hedram, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies*, London, 1938, Vol. 17 (1731), 5–6 (hereafter, *CSPC*).

² Stephen Conway, “From Fellow Citizens to Foreigners: British Reception of the Americans, circa 1730–1783,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d. Ser., 59, 2002; T. H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence*, 2004; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire: Ideas in Context*, Cambridge, 2000.

European culture, but without becoming genuine cosmopolitans they came to realize their own provinciality. These arguments demands that we should reconsider how Britons on both sides of the Atlantic thought about their regional character, identity, and common interest amid integrating trends of the British Empire in 18th century³.

This paper attempts to suggest a new insight into the complicated relationship between integration and divergence in the British Empire, focusing on some disputes about possession of the eastern frontier of Massachusetts, Maine, from the 1710s to the 1730s. While the zone of the North American frontier which bordered French colonies and surrounded British colonies was commonly understood as a vital area to progress the interests of the British Empire, it often became the background for the divergence of interests, prospects, and identities among Britons and colonials. For example, both people cooperated to fight to secure the western region of the Appalachian Mountains for the British Empire in the Seven Years War. But at the end of the war, they found that they had different prospects about the future of that region, as suggested by the opposition of the colonials to the royal proclamation of 1763 that prohibited their settlement, though it was aimed to enhance “our interest and security of Colonies”⁴. The difference of opinions about the North American

³ Barnard Bailyn, *To Begin the World Anew, The Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders*, New York, 2003 ; Eliga H. Gould, “Zones of Law, Zones of Violence : The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 1772,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d. Ser., 60, 2003 ; Linda Colley, *Captives : Britain, Empire, and the World 1600–1850*, London, 2002.

⁴ Bernard Bailyn, *Voyages to the West ; A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution*, New York, 1986, pp7–56 ; Gregory Nobles, *American Frontiers : Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest*, New York, 1997 ; Johns Hopkins University, 1992. ; Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire : The Backcountry in British North America*, Baltimore, 2003 ; François Furstenberg ,The Significance of Trans-


frontier, however, had begun as early as the late 17th century. By the beginning of the Anglo-French war in the late 17th century, some branches of the British Government and imperialists began considering that the frontiers of the North American colonies, especially the eastern frontier of Massachusetts, had strategic importance for the interest of the British Empire, and then its policy ran counter to the interest of New Englanders, which resulted in many conflicts and disputes as suggested in the beginnings of this paper.

Besides Joseph J. Malone, however, scholars have not sufficiently analyzed these matters, because the frontier policy of British government towards the eastern frontier of Massachusetts was thought of as being merely one of the many failures of mercantilist shames encountered in the Colonies⁵. But I believe that these conflicts and disputes may be useful as a symbolic material for considering how colonials and Britons thought about the British Empire and the people living within it, and what the difference between them was. When British imperialists like David Dunbar thought it necessary that colonials should be regulated as to the possession or usage of frontier lands and resources for the British empire, his argument was not only derived from the colonial policy of the British government, but also from his observation on the nature of colonial society. On the other hand, when the colonials of Massachusetts tried to defend their ever-holding rights, they also explained their argu-

Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History, *Journal of American History*, 2008, 647–677.

⁵ Kurt William Nagel, "Empire and Interest: British Colonial Defense Policy, 1689–1748," Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1992; Joseph J. Malone, *Pine Trees and Politics*, New York: Arno Press, 1979; Robert E. Moody, "The Proposed Colony of Georgia in New England, 1713–1733," Colonial Society of Massachusetts, *Publications*, XXIX, Transactions, 1937–1942, 194. See also, Strother E. Roberts, "Pines, Profits, and Popular Politics: Response to the White Pine Acts in the Colonial Connecticut River Valley," *The New England Quarterly*, Vol., 83, March, 2010, 73–101.

ments with their crucial role within the British Empire, rejecting the arguments of the British imperialists.



Before analyzing the conflicts and debates concerning Maine, let us look at the history of Maine in a larger context, because an important point of the contention originated in the long-term continuation of the unstable situation there. In fact, from the creation of the Colony of Maine in the early 17th century, the dominant power shifted over and over between different owners, and often-times overlapped. As early as 1607, the settlement of north New England began as the enterprise of a distinguished army officer Ferdinando Gorge. In 1621, he

formed a group called the Council for New England and was granted a royal charter for this region, named the Province of Maine. Eight years later, Gorge and John Mason divided their realm, and Gorge secured control of the land north of the Piscataqua River. His death in 1647 and the Civil War in England gave an opportunity for Massachusetts to enlarge their dominion to the north. But after the Restoration, descendants of Gorge claimed proprietorship until 1676, when Massachusetts bought it. On the other hand, the eastern part of Main, Sagadahoc, was granted to the Plymouth Colony by Gorge in 1630, but proprietorship had changed many times, and even belonged to New York from 1676. After the collapse of the New England Dominion, which dominated the entire New England, King William authorized formal possession of the entire Maine to Massachusetts by royal charter granted in 1691. But because the settlers of Maine had also settled in New England to get commercial gain such as fish, lumber, and fur, they did not easily accept the pious ways of Puritan Massachusetts. Although the towns of Maine sent their representatives to the House of Representatives, even in 18th century Maine retained the name “Eastern Frontier” differing from the main part of Massachusetts⁶.

But the primary factor that had kept Maine in a “frontier” situation until the middle of 18th Century was the resistance of resident Natives. The Wabenakis, who had controlled a large territory in Northeastern North America, rapidly decreased their population through war with the Iroquois and disease brought by Europeans in the first half of the 17th century. But with strong military power and effective tactics like “skulking”, the Wabenakis often destroyed English settlements and forts from the outbreak of King Philip’s War in 1676.

⁶ Joseph A. Conforti, *Saints and Strangers: New England in British North America*, Baltimore, 2006, 67–97; Douglas Edward Leach, *The Northern Frontier, 1607–1763*, 50–51.

Their war efforts increasingly became stronger itself with the support of the French from the onset of Anglo–French hostility in 1689. Though the government of Massachusetts forbade residents of Maine from moving elsewhere in wartime, even the English towns settled to the south of Wells from the early 17th century had been repeatedly forced to retreat until the Treaties of Utrecht in 1713. The English–Wabenaki war continued for half a century and damaged Wabenaki society immensely, but it hindered the development of English settlement as well. In fact, at the end of Dummer’s War (1722–1725), white population of Maine was only about 5000, and only five towns remained. Some historians recently said, until 1725 Maine “remained what it had been since the early 17th century”⁷.

Even in these unstable situations, Maine became deeply embedded in the larger Atlantic world from the late 17th century. For its rich natural resources and strategic position bordering English–French Colonies, Maine attracted growing interest in Britain. From the beginning of the Anglo–French war, the English government considered Maine as a vital region for keeping its naval power. For the English government, Maine was an alternative place for supplying naval stores, especially mast timber, when the supply from the Baltic countries decreased in times of war. The Navy began making contracts for mast timber with New England merchants. Furthermore the English government

⁷ Bruce J. Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years, American Indians in Maine*, Lincoln and London, 2001 ; Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast : The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki–Euroamerican Relations*, Berkeley, 1984 ; Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, “Ameindian Power in the Early Modern Northwest : A Reprisal,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3d. Ser., vol. 61, 2004 ; John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century*, Tronto, 2008, 129–173. For population and town numbers, see Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years* and John S.C. Abbott, *The History of Maine*, Augusta, 1892, 337–340.

started the forest policy for the steady influx of mast timber to England ; in the Charter of Massachusetts granted in 1691, a regulation for cutting white pines was stipulated ; in 1704 that regulation was applied to the entire New England as an act of English Parliament ; next year a governmental post named the “Surveyor General of the Woods” was established for the inspection of that act. The Government viewed their forest policy as being for the “Public Good” of the British Empire, and called for the woods of New England to be reserved as the “King’s Woods”⁸.

But Massachusetts colonials also started paying attention to forest resources in Maine for the use of their lumber industry. Timber cutting from New England forests, especially white pine, was highly valued not only in New England, but also in other markets in the Atlantic area such as West India and Iberian countries as building materials like boards and planks, and as naval stores, because of its length, sharpness, softness, and flexibility. The lumber industry grew up into one of the main economic sectors of New England until the first half of the 18th century. For example, seventy sawmills operated in the basin of the Piscataqua River in 1706, and Jonathan Bridger, the first Surveyor General of the Woods, said 40,000 men worked in the entire New England forest in 1720. But the development of the lumber industry was retarded in Maine due to ensuing wars, and progressed only after the decrease of the forest in New Hampshire in the 1710s. This development warned the British government to make efforts to preserve New England forests, but their forest policy could not stop the rapid progress of timber cutting, resulting in the vicious cy-

⁸ Nagel, “Empire and Interest,” 163–228 ; Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 10–56 ; William Cronon, *Changes in the Land : Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*, New York, 1983, trans., chap. 6.

cle of the tightening of the White Pine act only to see the number and technique of violations increase⁹.

After the Treaties of Utrecht, another clash of interests appeared. This time, interests in settling Maine, especially the undeveloped region of the Kennebec River basin (hereafter, eastern Maine), arose in Massachusetts and Britain alike, not only for economic gain, but also from geopolitical perspectives such as defense against French and Indian incursions. After 1714, the Massachusetts General Court carried out a new settlement plan which should exempt new towns from taxes and defend them with garrisons and forts. Under these encouragements, the Pejoscot Company, a small band of investors including leading merchant Thomas Hutchison, confirmed their plan to create three towns on a tract of a half million acres in the southwestern Kennebec River area. Also in the late 1710s, another group of speculators started settlement on the eastern region of Kennebec River; for example, the Musgongus Company, which consisted of many leading politicians of Massachusetts such as Elisha Cook, gained a tract of a half million acres. These settlements were only a part of many new towns created in the 18th century in all parts of the country by absent proprietors to gain revenue from land¹⁰.

On the other hand, some groups in Britain also proposed settlement in the same region of Maine. While their plans had some common features with those of Massachusetts, their basic purposes differed. Among eight settlement plans for Maine petitioned to the British government from 1713 to 1730, six were

⁹ Roberts, "Pines, Profits, and Popular Politics", 75-77; Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 57-81. For numbers, see, James Phinny Baxter, ed., *Documentary History of Maine*, Portland: Maine, 1869-1916, Vol. 10. P.134-9 (Hereafter, *Bax. Mss.*).

¹⁰ Leach, *The Northern Frontier*, 172-4; Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 74-75. For the resettlement policy of Massachusetts, see *Bax. Mss.*, 29, 237-44.

from minority members of British society like French Protestants or jobless retired officers and soldiers. Their plans shared basic ideals ; establishing a new colony in the vast area from Kennebec River to St. Croix River to produce naval stores and to occupy the frontier of the British Empire. These petitions were initiated by the persons who promoted the idea called “Mercantile Philanthropy”, the ideal of which was to relieve the poor of Britain and Europe, for example “distressed Foreign Protestants”, for the interest of the British Empire. In fact, it was Thomas Coram who managed the substantial business of the new colony plans of retired officers and soldiers from 1713 to 1724. After living in New England as a shipbuilder, he came back to England as a merchant and later became famous as a philanthropist who established the London Foundling Hospital. He was also one of the founding members of the Georgia Trustee. Through his commitment, many new projects for establishing colonies in the frontier planned in first half of 18th century were installed with an ideology of philanthropy¹¹.

Above all, these complicated situations in Maine, frequent changes of rulers, chronicles of war, and increasing interests from diverse groups in Britain and Massachusetts, caused many conflicts and debates between interested parties until the 1730s, with even the governments of both sides of Atlantic involved.

¹¹ About the new colony plan of the retired officers and Coram, see Moody, “The Proposed Colony of Georgia in New England”, 256-263. They submitted a large number of petitions and memorials to British government. Especially, see *CSPC*, 27 (1712-14), 187-96, 192, 222-23 ; *CSPC*, 28 (1714-15), 51,100,300, 323-24. About the petitions of French Protestants, see *CSPC*, 28, 308. Some scholars deal with Coram in the context of British Nationalism. See Linda Colley, *Britons : Forging the Nation*, New Haven, 1992, trans., chap. 2.

The structure of conflicts concerning Maine consisted of simply two rivals. On the one hand stood royal officials and new colony planners, whose claims often clashed with the existing rights of colonials. On the other were colonials equally determined to resist the new infringement of their rights. Some of these were taken to the British government for legal judgment: (1) the Surveyor General of the Woods, Jonathan Bridger, versus Elisha Cook about regulations of forest cutting in the “King’s Woods” (1717~21); (2) the retired officers, who planned founding a new colony in eastern Maine, versus the government of Massachusetts and proprietors (1713~24); and (3) the Surveyor General of the Woods, David Dunbar, who planned establishing new colony in Maine, versus the government of Massachusetts and proprietors (1729–31). I would like to analyze case (3), but before starting that story we need to examine the serious problems concerning various kinds of rights in Maine.

In the conflicts concerning Maine, the land titles of colonials and their sovereign authority to Maine were called into question. This question was basically derived from the complicated structure of Empire in early modern Europe that extended beyond Atlantic and from the fragility of authority in the borderlands. For example, in case (1), for opposing against the regulation of forest cutting, Cook insisted that because Massachusetts bought the proprietorship of Maine, Maine was the “private property” of Massachusetts, and the King had no rights, claims, or power in Maine. On the other hand, the law advisor of the British government argued that a “Body politic” like Massachusetts might not have right to buy land without an express license for that purpose¹².

¹² Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 70–74. For opinion of Bridger see, *Bax. Mss.*, 10, 126–27; *CSPC*, 29 (1717–18), 307–310; *CSPC*, 31 (1719–20), 144–145. For the opinion of Cook, see Eliza Cooke, *Mr. Cooke’s Just and Seasonable Vindication: Respecting Some Affairs Transacted in the late General Assembly at Boston, 1720*, Reprint. Mr. West, adviser

Further, royal officials and interest groups had ample reason to doubt the sincerity of land titles of colonials. For example, on the hearing held for case (2), the Duke of Hamilton, one of the proprietors on eastern Maine, was asked to prove his title, but he replied that his deed was “not found”¹³. The problem of questionable land title like this was mainly caused by land proprietors’ using “ancient right” for their claims. From the time of establishment, land grant was issued by various authorities in Maine : Gorge family, Plymouth Colony, which was granted eastern Maine (Sagadahoc) in 1630, the Duke of Yoke, the Dominion of New England, and Massachusetts. In addition, many land titles were purchased from Indians without confirmation of any authority. Some of these land titles were dormant for a long time and were of “no value to the owners or possessors”, but land speculators and mill owners of New England had bought them for small sums from the late 17th century¹⁴.

In fact, these “ancient rights” caused many troubles. While Indian deeds were frequently obtained by using clandestine ways such as making Indians drunk, many “ancient rights” were forged. As a result, multiple claims were often made to the same land¹⁵. The Massachusetts General Court had examined the rightness of “ancient right” to facilitate settlement in Maine, but many conflicts remained unsettled. For example, the conflict between the Pejoscot Company and Plymouth Proprietor, both groups of speculators of Massachu-

of legal matter for the Council of Trade and Plantation, said his opinion about this question. See *CSPC*, 29, 388–91.

¹³ *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations : Preserved in the Public Record Office*, Kraus Reprint, 1969, 3 (Mar. 1714–5–Oct. 1718), 323 (Hereafter *B.T. Journal*).

¹⁴ Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 75 ; *Bax. Mss.*, 10, 135–36.

¹⁵ A Witness of Massachusetts, Col. Taylor, said that the practice of land purchase from drunken Indian was prevalent in Maine, and the Colony was trying to prevent that practice on hearing at Board of Trade. *B.T. Journal*, 3, 239.

setts with different “ancient right” over the land of the Kennebec River basin, were not settled until the late 1740s, when Governor Shirley was inclined to favor the program of Plymouth Proprietors to push ahead the British settlement against that of the French. And chronic war in Maine also caused a difficult problem for land titles. In 1728, the “ancient proprietors of Falmouth” complained to the Massachusetts General Court that because Indian war had destroyed their town and “town book”, they could not find out “the whole number that were admitted Settlers and Proprietors.” But many people had come “like flood” to set down on Falmouth and neighboring towns without “the least Consent” of existing residents “under pretense of authority”. When Francis Nicholson, who had served high royal officials in many colonial governments, was asked his opinion about case (2) in 1717, he said “no place had more controverted titles than the land in dispute¹⁶.”

Unstable political and social conditions in Maine such as frequent changes of regime or desertion of settlements became a background in Britain to question the sovereign authority of Massachusetts over Maine. For example, Thomas Coram insisted in case (2) that Massachusetts had lost its right of possession of eastern Maine because of its failure to defend that territory during King William’s War, and because Massachusetts had abandoned the Pemaquid fort, which seemed to be a mark of British possession. According to him, France incorporated that territory as a part of Acadia after the war, and the British Crown regained it in consequence of the capture of Acadia by the British Army in 1710. This interpretation was not applied to any order of the British government, but because a decision of a committee of the Privy Council of December

¹⁶ Leach, *The Northern Frontier*, 175; *Bax. Mss.*, 10, 423–27; *B. T. Journal*, 3, 239.

20, 1720 mentioned a similar view, there was enough possibility that Maine, at least eastern Maine, reverted to the Crown¹⁷.

As these instances suggest, many people in Britain and America, including French, Indians, and even the colonials of Massachusetts themselves, had some doubts about colonials' sovereign authority and validity of land title in Maine in the early 18th century. In 1718, when the Massachusetts Agent to Whitehall, Jeremiah Dummer, was asked his opinion about the status of the territory between the Kennebec River and the St. Croix River in the hearing for case (2), he said that "it became a sort of derelict place" because of war¹⁸, and that the territory also had a serious problem concerning land titles caused by grants from various authorities. But the British governments' inclination to evade its conclusion about conflicts concerning private land title or possession of territory in North America made case (1) and (2) remained unsettled. Under these circumstances, groups and persons interested in Maine struggled to justify their claims using various new constructions. We could see the typical example in case (3) : a trouble caused by the newly appointed royal officer David Dunbar's supposed new colony.

Before coming to New England, Dunbar had been a Colonel in the British army and a member of the Irish Parliament supporting the Crown. For tightening the enforcement of the forest policy of the British government, he was chosen to be the Surveyor General of Woods in December 1727. Just after being commissioned, he was interested in founding a new colony in the territory between the Kennebec River and the St. Croix River, and he, along with Tomas

¹⁷ *CSPC*, 27, 190–194 ; 29 (1716–17), 323–5 ; 32 (1720–21), 21 ; 34 (1724–25), 453.

¹⁸ *B.T. Journal*, 3, 352.

Coram, who revived his zeal for making a new colony, petitioned the King in May, 1729. Their basic plan duplicated former new colony plans proposed by retired officers and soldiers. The Board of Trade approved their plan on a representation to the King as a new colony named "Georgia", added with its purpose the establishment of a forest reservation in Maine. But the Privy Council rejected their petition, and then an order was issued to Dunbar only to lay-out a settlement as a district of Nova Scotia¹⁹.

After arriving at Boston in September, 1729, Dunbar advertised his "New Colony in the East," and started building a new settlement with Irish settlers at Pemaquid Fort near the mouth of the Kennebec River. But this action, with his criticism against landholders and mill owners in Maine, aroused fierce opposition from a broad spectrum of Massachusetts society: political leaders, lumber-men, and speculators already investing in that region. Even the populace of Boston censured him, calling him a "land pirate", and threatening him with mob action. From February, 1730, as proprietors of eastern Maine petitioned to the King against Dunbar, the affair became a political issue beyond the Atlantic. Especially a "military expedition" launched by Governor Jonathan Belcher to arrest Dunbar's settlers alarmed the British government into ordering him to be restrained. In September, 1731, the Privy Council approved the petitions of Massachusetts, and the conflict came to the end²⁰.

Because Dunbar was also nominated to be the Lieutenant Governor of

¹⁹ Moody, "The Proposed Colony of Georgia in New England", 263; *CSPC*, 36 (1728-29), 364, 371; *CSPC*, 37 (1730), 11. According to Scott Rohrer, Dunbar's new colony is also considered as one of many Irish settlements created in North American frontier. See his *Wandering Souls: Protestant Migrations in America, 1630-1865*, Chapel Hill, 2010, 77-86.

²⁰ *The Boston Gazette*, Aug. 17, 1730; *CSPC*, 36, 549-50, 543; *The Boston Gazette*, Oct. 19, 1730; *CSPC*, 37, pp. 322-23, 340, 353; *CSPC*, 38 (1731), 9-13, 18, 51-53.

New Hampshire in February, 1731, and then a deep hostility arose between him and Belcher, who was also commissioned as New Hampshire Governor, the trouble caused by Dunbar's "Georgia" has been dealt with in the context of political history of Massachusetts²¹. But it is important for us here that Britons and colonials thought of this affair within the context of the British Empire. In the following discussion, I will first examine the historical context of Dunbar's action and then the reason he thought his action justifiable.

Though supported by the Board of Trade, Dunbar's plan and action for founding a new colony were only his personal adventure based on his money and the small circle of his friends and relatives. It is evident that Dunbar sought his private advantage such as honor, as suggested by his saying "my aim as to my own advantage was ...a Brevett Governor without sallary or perquisites." But Dunbar also had a strong inclination to establish a new colony useful to the public of the British Empire. On the petition in May, 1729, he and Coram asserted "the absolutory necessary" to establish a new royal colony in eastern Maine "for the service of King and the future security and advantage of H. M. northern Plantations". They assumed the security of the northern colonies, the production of naval stores, and Quit Rent as public advantages, and then Dunbar added the establishment of a forest reservation of 100,000 acres in Maine. One of the important purposes was to relieve the Protestant poor in Britain, America, and Europe. In a memorial to the Board of Trade in March, 1729, Dunbar proposed as settlers of the new colony some landless Irish Protestants already immigrated to Massachusetts. His plan joined another settle-

²¹ William Pencak, *War, Politics, and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts*, Boston, 1981, 95-101 ; Malone, *Pine, Trees and Politics*, 94-123. About the conflict between Dunbar and Massachusetts, see also Abbott, *The History of Maine*, 164-175.

ment plan of Daniel Hintze to send “poor Palatine” from southern Germany to Nova Scotia²². Although in Massachusetts Dunbar was blamed for fraudulently making money by granting land, an ex-settler Samuel Cove recalled that lands were granted on generous terms in “Georgia”, and Dunbar seemed to try sincerely to contribute to the benefit of the poor and the British Empire alike²³.

According to Verner Crane’s classic study, some Britons with philanthropic minds or who administered corporations established for missionary activity, especially Dr. Thomas Bray, became interested in making new colonies in British American territory until the 1730s. They commonly planned to relieve the people in distressed situations in Britain, Europe, and America, but they also sought zealously to enhance and secure British interests in foreign parts ahead of the British government. As Linda Colley suggests, these philanthropic activities were deeply connected to the rising tide of nationalism in the 18th century. The most famous of these was Georgia, founded by a philanthropic corporation, the Georgia Trustee, on the southern fringe of British North America in 1732. As Martin Braden, the leader of the Board of Trade, said as to Georgia, “the zeal which some gentlemen have shewn of late for making settlement, and for securing our southern frontiers on the Continent of America” was “an ex-

²² *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 26; *CSPC*, 36, 364, 551–5, 371–3; *CSPC*, 37 (1730), 240. After returning to Britain in 1738, he applied to the Board of Trade to repay part of the money he spent to make his colony. He estimated the amount at 11,931 pound sterling in New England money. But as he could not get out of his debt of 8,570 pound sterling, he was imprisoned in Fleet prison next year. The Board supported his application, but the Privy Council dismissed it. *CSPC*, 44 (1738), 148, 157; *CSPC*, 45 (1739), 148.

²³ Washington C. Ford., et., al., eds, *Journal of House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay*, Boston, 1927, Vol., 7, 387 (hereafter *House Journal*); Kerby Miller, Arnold Shrier, Bruce D. Boling and David N. Doyle., eds., *Irish Immigrants in the Land of Canaan: Letters and Memoirs from Colonial and Revolutionary America, 1675–1815*, Oxford, 2003, 127–131.

ample that will reflect some discredit upon the publik”, the British philanthropic activists appreciated North America as an ideal place for their enterprise while the British government was disinterested in North America. Presumably Dunbar envisioned his new colony as one of these British philanthropic and nationalistic activities, as suggested by the fact that Dunbar’s supposed Georgia had many common purposes with later Georgia, such as the relief of poor Protestants or the creation of a buffer zone between British and French colonies²⁴.

The importance of these social movements within the context of the British Empire lay not only in their paying attention to the frontiers of North America more eagerly than the British government did, but also in the explanation they gave as to the reason of founding new colonies, because in it was included harsh criticism against colonials and the society they had made on the periphery of the British Empire. They often claimed that the North American colonies had many serious defects, for example slavery, and that those defects hindered the increase of the wealth of the British Empire, endangered the life and property of colonials themselves, and deprived people living within the Empire of

²⁴ Verner Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732*, Durham, 1928, 323–325. Anti-court nationalists asserted that the British government should support the affairs of the American colonies because of their contribution to true national interest, see Kathleen Wilson, “Empire of Virtue: The Imperial Project and Hanoverian Culture c.1720–1785, Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689–1815*, London, 1994, 128–164; Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of American Revolution*, Chapel Hill, 1993, 1–34. As to Georgia, see Betty Wood, “The Earl of Egmont and the Georgia Colony,” Harvey H. Jackson and Phinizy Spalding, eds., *Forty Years of Diversity; Essays on Colonial Georgia*, Athens, 1984, 80–100. For the settlement plan of Georgia colony, see Benjamin Martyn, *Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia*, 1733. Martin Braden’s statement is included in his plan for the enhancement of British interest in Nova Scotia. See *CSPC*, 41 (1735–6), 454–458.

their liberty. For the public advantage of the British Empire, making new colonies differing from existing colonies was needed²⁵. It was David Dunbar who asserted more convincingly this view based on his observation of colonial society and his experience of colonial life.

For example, Dunbar eagerly reported to the British government the Massachusetts colonists' harsh treatments of some non - English ethnic groups. On May, 1729, he reported that Irish immigrants in Massachusetts, anxious about oppression, hoped to resettle in another place, and on August, 1730, he stated that Palatines who happened to come to Boston after shipwreck were treated "like Negro" and forced to labor in the forest in Maine by Bostonians. When his Irish settlers were imprisoned, he criticized that "this is ye justice of this country to strangers and foreigners as all H. M. European subjects are called here!" In fact, since 1726 Irish immigrants who settled on the border of Massachusetts-New Hampshire were oftentimes accused of their "trespass" by nearby townsmen of Massachusetts and threatened with violence if they didn't leave. They petitioned the British government about their distress as "the liberty of the subject has been violated.....tho' good protestants, and loyal subjects of King George"²⁶. Dunbar informed the home government these conditions as a trait of Massachusetts society: intolerance to other ethnic groups living

²⁵ Jack P. Greene, *Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural History*, Charlottesville and London, 1992, 113-142; idem, "Empire and Identity from Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution, P. J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of British Empire Vol. 2: The Eighteenth Century*, Oxford, 223-234. For criticism against colonists, see Michal J. Rozbicki, *The Complete Colonial Gentleman: Cultural Legitimacy in Plantation America*, Charlottesville and London, 1998, 76-126.

²⁶ CSPC, 36, 496; *Ibid*, 37, 241, 322. For petitions against Irish immigrants, see Washington C. Ford., et, al., eds., *House Journal*, 7, 197.; *Ibid*, 8, 130,409. James G. Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish: A Social History*, Chapel Hill, 1962, 236-242. For petitions of Irish immigrants to the British government, see CSPC, 35, 213.

within the British Empire.

In addition, Dunbar concluded through observation of the conduct of colonists in Maine that their relentless seeking of private profits obstructed the public advantage of the British Empire. After his first visit on December 1729, Dunbar found that the colonists took the “King’s Woods” on a large scale for private use, but didn’t advance any actual settlement. As a result, almost all the land of Maine was “waste”, giving room for foreign powers to invade the British territory. Dunbar judged one reason for making this condition was the land titles that Massachusetts colonists had in Maine. For example, he had “seen some pretended Indian deeds of different dates wherein 30 miles square were sold for 50 skins.” Large landholding by speculators for resale, Dunbar said, raised land prices, and hindered progress of actual settlement. Furthermore, pretended Indian deeds caused other problems such as “eternal suits and disputes among the people and endless appeals home” by “many different claims and titles to ye same lands” or Indian war by provoking their anger²⁷.

To remedy these troublesome conditions of Massachusetts and its frontier, Dunbar asserted that establishing a new colony, which would contribute to the benefit of the British Empire and people living within it, was needed. The image of his new colony formed a sharp contrast with the way colonists had ever settled in Maine.

I told them (the Muscongus Company) of the King’s intentions and terms of settling that country, they in a very dutiful manner should have those lands, and all others of H. M. Protestant subjects who would do the same

²⁷ *CSPC*, 36, 549-551, 554; *Ibid*, 37, 344-349; *Ibid*, 38, 120-25; *Ibid*, 39 (1732), 51, 122-124.

should also settle where they pleased..... As for the publique advantages accruing hereby I have onely this to say, that if recovering a fine and a vast country from a wilderness and planting an usefull Collny there.....by inconsiderable presents reconciling the savages to receive H. M. subjects with good will and friendship, instead of forcing them at an expence of blood and mony, or letting it remain a wilderness for ever.....²⁸

Dunbar was not the only person who informed Britain of these problems, making settlement by “blood and mony”, as defects of Massachusetts society. From the late 17th century, some royal officers, especially Edward Randolph, repeatedly pointed out to the home government the ungovernableness of the people of Massachusetts, and with the increase of visitors from Britain the criticism toward Massachusetts colonials gained new vigor until the 1730s. In 1717, Thomas Coram warned the Board of Trade that the Indian deed of Bibye Lake in eastern Maine was bought from only one Indian forced drunk without consent of his people and caused an Indian war. When Thomas Moore reported to the Secretary of State Lord Carteret about the state of affairs in the American Colonies in 1723, he emphasized that in Massachusetts a few rich men monopolized the wealth of the country and vast frontier lands, and that “barbarous treatment with Indians”, such as selling them to other countries as slaves, entangled New England in perpetual wars. The monopoly of frontier land was also pointed out as a defect of Massachusetts society by Archibald Cummings, a Collector of Customs of Boston, and preceding Dunbar he proposed founding a new colony in eastern Maine to distribute lands to small farmers²⁹.

²⁸ *CSPC*, 38, 126.

²⁹ *CSPC*, 30 (1717–18), 129; *Ibid*, 33 (1722–23), 254–260.

These views concerning Massachusetts colonial society supposedly suggested a growth of new ideas about the British overseas empire among some part of the British populace, especially in those interested in colonial affairs, until the 1730s, which had many different perspectives about the future of the British Empire with colonials in North America. The informations Dunbar and other visitors depended on were not incorrect, but they saw the society and people of colonies only from their own perspectives, and were often unconcerned with the fact that the colonials had attempted to respond to the requirement of the British Empire and developed their own idea about the Empire³⁰.

At last, I will examine how people of Massachusetts responded to Dunbar's action. As we have already seen, throughout Massachusetts a fierce opposition occurred against Dunbar. Considering the history of Massachusetts, this was a natural consequence. From the standpoint of Massachusetts colonials, they had defended their own territory, Maine, just a few years ago from the menace of Indians, using large sums of money, which amounted to £170,000, and sacrificing many lives of their countrymen. It was no wonder that the sudden occupation of their territory by an outsider seemed a tremendous evil action to them. In addition, according to Richard Bushman, in 18th century Massachusetts, royal officers were usually thought to be seekers of private profits sacrificing the welfare of the people, and the Surveyor of Woods was the most suspicious

³⁰ Richard Johnson and Brendan McConville said that after Glorious Revolution Massachusetts colonials attempted to reconcile their peculiarities, i.e. religious practice, political interests, and historical views with the British Empire. Richard Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: the New England colonies, 1675-1715*, Rutgers, 1982; Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776*, Chapel Hill, 2006, 15-48.

about his motives. A report of the committee for examining petitions against him said, Dunbar “not having exhibited ...any Commission” was nobody less than a corrupt official with “his Deceit and artful Contrivances” to make people impoverished³¹.

But I would like to examine the features of those arguments with which the Massachusetts colonials appealed to the British government rather than the background of their deep hostility toward Dunbar. In fact, they expressed their claims to the British government on at least on two occasions: (1) petitions which two proprietors of eastern Maine presented to the King in February and April, 1730, and their opinions on the hearing held at the Board of Trade from April to July, 1731; (2) petitions of five proprietors of eastern Maine to the Massachusetts General Court, a report of the committee to these petitions, and an address of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. The importance of the arguments included in these lay in the possibility that an analysis of those discourses could make it clear how colonials thought about their colony within the context of the British Empire. As the Board of Trade stated to the Lords Commissioners of Treasury responding to its order to examine petitions from Massachusetts that the aim of their examination was to ascertain “The title to the Government as well as to the property of the soil of the tract contended for”³², Massachusetts colonials had to defend their legal titles of eastern Maine against a claim to revert the territory to the British government. Their claims were basically grounded on the validity of their titles, but they also attempted to explain the rightfulness of their possession within the imperial context.

³¹ Richard Bushman, *King and People in Provincial Massachusetts*, Chapel Hill, 1985, 88–132; *House Journal*, 9 (1729–31), 387.

³² *CSPC*, 37 (1730), 200.

While the agent of Massachusetts submitted no other information about the sovereignty of Massachusetts over Maine than the fact that it was specified in the Charter, from the onset of their petition proprietors of eastern Maine had explained the rightfulness of their claims on various grounds other than the validity of their titles. Especially they commonly emphasized the history of their settlement and the fact that so much cost, effort, and life were expended for settling and defending their land. For example, the narrative of Bibye Lake, the agent for the Pejoscot Company, was composed of the details about settlement: his grandfather made settlements but was killed by Indians; one of the settlers, Thomas Clark, resettled “with great expense”, but again the settlements were “ruined” by Indian war; from 1714, Lake and his partners resumed their efforts to settle by sending a manager, John Watts, with 100 families of settlers and £2000. He was very “industrious” in making settlements, but Indians again destroyed them. Also much of the narrative of Samuel Waldo, the agent for the Muscongus Company, was a series of facts about efforts of settling. Since 1714 the descendant of proprietor John Leverett tried resettlement “with all possible Vigor and dispatch”. He formed associates, and with them settled 80 families “in Christian Manner” upon the tract. In spite of “many disturbances they received from the French Indians”, they “vigorously pushed forwards in settling”³³.

As many witnesses cited the existence of the petitioners’ settlement at the hearing of the Board of Trade, their arguments were probably grounded upon fact. But it is also true that they intentionally emphasized their cost and effort for the settlement, because we can see another example of Massachusetts people using the same logic. For example, the report and address of the Massa-

³³ *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 89–94; *CSPC*, 37, 83–84.

Massachusetts House of Representatives also referred to those costs and efforts expended to settle, with some intentional alteration of original petitions. While the proprietors' of eastern Maine stated on their petitions their hope to "quietly enjoy and improve the Land...without the unjust Molestation..of Col. Dunbar" and their complaints about Dunbar's action depriving them of "their just Right to and Improvement", a report of the committee added a narrative concerning those costs and efforts that "their Predecessors had been at very great Expence in building Houses" or "dwelt there the Space of *Thirty Five Years*", but were driven off "by the *Indian* enemy". As Waldo mentioned in his petition, "the Possession thereof for so many years, and been at a very great expences in erecting the Blockhouses" together with grants from the crown and Indian deed as evidence to have a title, those costs and efforts expended for settlement were thought one of the important causes to justify the claims to the land by Massachusetts colonials³⁴.

One reason for this common feature among those arguments of Massachusetts was that the petitioners thought that the validity of their titles might be questioned outside Massachusetts, so they attempted to reinforce their arguments on other grounds. In fact, among seven titles proprietors claimed against Dunbar, five were authorized by old Indian deeds obtained in the 17th century. Another two were not Indian deeds, but one was granted by the Council of New England and another by the Council of Plymouth in the early 17th century. As Governor Belcher wrote to the Board of Trade that "claimants think their title is right (though not granted by this government)", even those who opposed Dunbar were anxious about their titles. It is no wonder that the proprietors made excuses about their ancient right. On his petition, Waldo explained that

³⁴ *House Journal*, 9, 385-87; *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 124.

the titles bought “from Indians which is always held inviolable in these parts”³⁵.

But a more important reason was that there were some situations in which the argument stressing those costs and efforts to settle frontier might make effective results. As the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General to this case stated “in questions of this kind concerning Rights to Lands in the West Indies...the same regularity and exactness is not to be expected” as suits in England, making a legal decision to the complicated land disputes beyond Atlantic was extremely difficult matter. Therefore, it should be predicted among colonials that “the principal Regard ought to be had to the Possession and the Expences”³⁶.

In addition, the new colonial policy the British government launched in this period vigorously encouraged the advance of settlement in the entire North American frontier. According to Warren Hofstra, to check the supposed French intrusion, the Board of Trade has been paying attention to frontiers until the 1720s, and encouraged the Governors of colonies to generate a new policy for settling their frontiers³⁷. As their report to Lord Cartlet in 1721 stated, “the Assembly of Virginia have made considerable advances at their own expence” for settling frontier, the Board of Trade appreciated not only the advance of settlement, as it would “improve or even to preserve H.M. Empire in America”, but also at the colonials’ own expense³⁸. Sometimes the effort to settle was preferred to legitimate means for taking up the frontier land. For exam-

³⁵ *B. T. Journal*, 6, 160; *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 9; *Ibid.*, 26, 120.

³⁶ *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 127-28.

³⁷ Warren R Hofstra, “The Extension of His Majesties Dominions’: The Virginia Backcountry and Reconfiguration of Imperial Frontiers,” *Journal of American History*, 84, 1998, 1282-1312. *CSPC*, 32 (March 1720-December 1721), 321.

³⁸ *CSPC*, 35 (1726-27), 278-281.

ple, while the Board of Trade knew that Alexander Spotswood, ex-Governor of Virginia, obtained 850,000 acres of frontier lands through illegal means, they appealed to the Privy Council for permission of his possession, considering as proof, “of his having imported numbers of white servants, and of having made such improvements upon the lands in question”. The Massachusetts colonials might have been aware of this situation. In fact, Lake stated in his petition that the settlement he and his ancestors had made with “great pains and expence” will be of “great advantage to the Trade of this Kingdom”. Waldo also argued that the blockhouse his associates had erected “Guarded and Protected all that part of the Country”, and they intended with all possible dispatch to complete the settlements, which “being of great advantage to the Province of the Massachusetts and His Majesty's Interest there”³⁹.

But we have to consider that this argument, asking for privileges in exchange for their own “charges and labour” to enlarge the British Empire, was not used expediently upon a particular situation, but resembled the preceding arguments of colonials. From the early 18th century on, whenever the Massachusetts colonials petitioned to the British government, they often relied upon the same argument. Among others, the most elaborate argument was submitted by Jeremiah Dummer. In his pamphlet, *A Defence of the New-England Charters* in 1721, published to oppose a plan for the forfeiture of Massachusetts's Charter, Dummer attested precisely that the planters of New England had made settlement at their own charge and effort without any assistance from England, but made “the great advantages thence accruing to the crown and nation”. The Massachusetts government not only “protected King's subjects”, having “discovered a noble zeal to enlarge the British Empire,” but also

³⁹ *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 124 ; *CSPC*, 37, 84.

undertook several expeditions against Canada at their own charge. Their charter was given “as premiums for services to be performed”, so that its forfeiture would be unreasonable⁴⁰.

This type of argument also became prevalent among other colonies until the middle of the 18th century. Asking for military aid from the King, the Assembly of New Hampshire stated in 1708, “By the diligent industry and experience of your Majesties loyal subjects, we have so improved this your Majesties Contrey”, and on the address to the King in 1725, the Representatives of Pennsylvania stressed that their ancestors “at their own charge contribute to this enlargement of the British Empire” due to privilege given to Quakers. As these examples suggest, colonials in the 18th century were accustomed to the idea that they should be given privileges, rights, or support from Britain for their own efforts to enlarge the British Empire⁴¹. As Peter Messer suggests, this idea arose in response to the change of colonial society and to their involvement within the British Empire. While colonial society gradually enlarged in population and economy in the 18th century, colonials became deeply involved in the affairs of Britain through war, trade, and cultural transaction. In the process, they recognized that the distinctiveness of their society derived from their ancestors’ struggle in the New World and also from their importance within the British Empire. When colonials attempted to evade new regulations, to oppose criticism from Britain, and to secure privilege or military aids, they justified their action with the idea that it was colonials themselves who had made the Empire in North America⁴². Sometimes they achieved their

⁴⁰ Bushman, *King and People*, 32–34; Jeremiah Dummer, *A Defence of the New-England Charters*, London, 1721.

⁴¹ *CSPC*, 24, 52–53; *Ibid*, 34, 470–71.

⁴² Peter C. Messer, *Stories of Independence; Identity, Ideology, and History in Eighteenth-*

purpose with this argument, as suggested by the King's support of the Canada Expedition planned by colonials in 1709 and 1710.

Therefore, we find in those arguments and activities of the Massachusetts colonials against Dunbar that they realized their being integrated into the British Empire, and from their own point of view, which stressed their activity in colonial North America, including frontier settlement, they played an important role within the British Empire. In fact, it was predicted about Massachusetts that if they should pledge directly to the British government their steady efforts to settle frontier, it would be justly appreciated. In 1731, the House of Representatives ordered the drought of their petition to the King that the interruption of regular settlement on the frontier by "His Majesty's good Subjects" was "to the great Disservice of His Majesty's Interest"⁴³. Colonials in London also more vigorously appealed to the British government their argument with seven witnesses, all of whom mentioned the existence of settlement, than Dunbar's side, which could not able to call enough witness to support him and could not submit effective arguments.

Accepting the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, which stated that "the Petitioners..ought not to be disturbed in their possession or interrupted in carrying on their Settlements", the Privy Council ordered Dunbar to quit Maine on October, 1732⁴⁴. This decision was not only a turning point concerning the sovereignty of Maine, but also had a symbolic meaning in the long-term change of the relationship between the colonies and Britain.

Century America, Dekalb, 2005, 3-44

⁴³ *House Journal*, 9, 383.

⁴⁴ *Bax. Mss.*, 11, 128.

As we have seen, some different views about the British Empire emerged between Britons and colonials up to the 1730s, and it was the frontier region that highlighted it. At the same time, the British government increasingly began emphasizing the economic development of the British Empire by making efficient use of the rapid development of the North American colonies, overlooking constitutional problems inherent in the colonial system, breaches of regulation, and colonial officials' neglect of duty⁴⁵. For example, after Dunbar had caused serious troubles in New England, the British government changed the person of the Surveyor General of Woods from Britons to New Englanders. From 1743 to 1766, the Governor of New Hampshire, Benning Wentworth held the post, while being involved in the timber business. In all his years of service, he did not serve enthusiastically, prosecuting no more than a dozen offenders. But in these years, exports of mast timber for the Navy from New England increased three times. As Ellis Huske, New Hampshire merchant, said proudly in 1755, "It is from the American colonies our Royal Navy is supplied in a great Measure with Masts of all size and other Naval Stores," the colonials' view of the British Empire developed from the early 18th century to gain more substance beneath the seemingly moderate colonial policy in the middle of the 18th century⁴⁶.

From the 1750s, however, when colonials and Britons increasingly were aware of their discordance, the frontier region once again became one of the

⁴⁵ Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Precondition of the American Revolution," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., *Essays on the American Revolution*, Williamsburg, 1973, 33-80; Idem, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788*, New York, 1986.

⁴⁶ Bushman, *King and People*, 141-42; Gould, *The Persistence of Empire*, 62.

main theaters of contention between them. According to Gould, when Britons and colonials fought together against the French in the Seven Years War, various negative images describing colonials as undisciplined militia or merchants smuggling with the enemy, like as Dunbar's negative representation, spread in Britain, so that British public opinion opposed the possession and governing of the colonials of the newly acquired territory at the end of war⁴⁷. Of course, this opinion and the new frontier policy the British government suggested caused criticism among the colonials, who came more and more to consider themselves playing an indispensable role within the British Empire.

⁴⁷ Gould, "Fears of War, Fantasies of War: British Politics and the Coming of the American Revolution," idem and Peter S. Onuf eds., *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World*, 2005, 19–34.